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Asymmetric Wholesale Pricing: 
Theory and Evidence 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Asymmetric pricing is the phenomenon where prices rise more readily than they fall. We 
articulate, and provide empirical support for, a theory of asymmetric pricing in wholesale 
prices. In particular, we show how wholesale prices may be asymmetric in the small but 
symmetric in the large, when retailers face costs of price adjustments. Such retailers will not 
adjust prices for small changes in their costs. Upstream manufacturers then see a region of 
inelastic demand where small wholesale price changes do not translate into commensurate 
retail price changes. The implication is asymmetric – small wholesale increases are more 
profitable because manufacturers will not lose customers from higher retail prices; yet, small 
wholesale decreases are less profitable, because these will not create lower retail prices, hence 
no extra revenue from greater sales. For larger changes, this asymmetry at wholesale vanishes 
as the costs of changing prices are compensated by increases in retailers’ revenue that result 
from correspondingly large retail price changes. We first present a formal economic model of 
a channel with forward looking retailers facing costs of price adjustment to derive the testable 
propositions. Next, we test these on manufacturer prices in a supermarket scanner dataset to 
find support for our theory. We discuss the contributions of the results for the asymmetric 
pricing, distribution channels and cost of price adjustment literatures, and implications for 
public policy. 
1. Introduction 
Asymmetric pricing is a phenomenon where prices rise readily but fall slowly. Frequent 
reports in the popular press lament the fact that prices are asymmetric. It is not uncommon to read 
headlines about prices “rising like rockets …(but)… falling like feathers” (Octane, v.13-3, June 
1999, pp.6-7); retail pork prices not coming down even if hog prices do (New York Times, Jan. 7, 
1999) and government subsidies to dairy farmers not lowering dairy products prices, even if a hike 
in the price of industrial milk paid to farmers, raises such prices at the store (Canadian Press 
Newswire, Dec. 18, 2000). The resulting public interest in the phenomenon has spawned a large 
academic literature devoted to the issue. Asymmetry has been studied across a broad range of 
product markets (Peltzman, 2000), including gasoline (Bacon, 1991; Borenstein and Shepard, 1996; 
Karrenbrock, 1991); fruit and vegetables (Pick et al., 1991; Ward, 1982); pork (Boyde and Brorsen, 
1988); and banking (Hannan and Berger, 1991; Neumark and Sharpe, 1992). 
Yet, despite the substantial research in asymmetric pricing, the theoretical literature in the 
area is still in its nascent stages. Peltzman (2000) for example, comments that “Economic theory 
suggests no pervasive tendency for prices to respond … (asymmetrically) …” Most existing 
research is empirically driven, attempting to establish the scale and scope of asymmetry. Only a few 
papers develop formal theories. These include explanations based on monopoly power (Benabou 
and Gertner, 1993; Borenstein and Shepard, 1996), inflation with costs of price adjustment (Ball 
and Mankiw, 1994), elasticity differences in a channel with costs of price adjustment (Madsen and 
Yang, 1998) and information processing costs of consumers (Chen et al. 2004). Yet, in the context 
of the broad evidence of asymmetric pricing, the theoretical field is still largely unexplored. For 
authors like Peltzman (2000) this represents a “serious gap in a fundamental area of economic 
theory.” Similar sentiments are echoed by Ball and Mankiw (1994), Borenstein et al. (1997), and 
Blinder et al. (1998), all calling for further theory development to close this gap. Surprisingly, given 
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the ubiquity of the phenomenon and the rich marketing literature in pricing (cf. DeSarbo et al., 
1987; Hess and Gerstner, 1987; Ratchford and Srinivasan, 1993; Tellis and Zufryden, 1995; 
Kadiyali et al., 2000), marketing’s contribution to research in asymmetric pricing has been marginal 
till date. To the best of our knowledge, marketing has not directly studied asymmetric pricing.1   
In this paper we hope to address this gap by offering, and providing empirical support for, a 
theory of asymmetric pricing. Our theory combines insights from the literature on channels of 
distribution with insights from the literature on costs of price adjustment to suggest why wholesale 
prices may be asymmetric. This is a natural direction to explore for two very important reasons. 
First, we know little about the role played by the distribution channel and the business-to-
business linkages implied therein, in determining asymmetric pricing at any level of the channel. 
Yet, such linkages have been consistently argued to have important influences on the channel’s 
pricing practices.2 There is no reason to believe asymmetric pricing will be an exception. Quite to 
the contrary, Peltzman (2000) suggests, “an explanation for asymmetry may require a fuller 
understanding of those vertical market linkages.” By focusing on asymmetry in wholesale prices in 
the context of a distribution channel, we help to clarify the role of such vertical linkages. 
Second, while there is a large literature on the importance of costs of price adjustment for 
price rigidity we are only beginning to develop our understanding of the implications of these costs 
on both pricing decisions of other members of the distribution channel, and asymmetric pricing.3 
For example, Levy et al. (1997) attempt to calibrate the source and magnitude of these costs, but do 
not explore asymmetry or the implications for channel pricing. On the other hand, Ball and Mankiw 
                                                 
1 The marketing literature on price adjustment costs is limited. See the paper on haggling by Desai and Purohit (2004) as 
an example of how these costs might impact marketing strategy. On asymmetry, see Greenleaf, (1995); Kopalle et al. 
(1996) etc. for their consideration of asymmetric reference price effects which is the closest related work. 
2 See Jeuland and Shugan (1983); Moorthy (1988); Choi (1991); Messinger and Narasimhan (1995); Ingene and Parry 
(1995); Bergen et al. (1996) etc. 
3 For the literature on these costs, see Mankiw, 1985; Ball and Mankiw, 1994, 1995; Danziger, 1987; Levy et al., 1997; 
Basu, 1995; Blinder et al., 1998; Dutta et al., 1999; Slade, 1998; Zbaracki et al., 2004 etc.  
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(1994) combine costs of price adjustment with inflation to offer an explanation of asymmetric 
pricing. There are also authors who combine channels of distribution and costs of price adjustment. 
For example, Basu (1995) has addressed both price adjustment costs and channels of distribution in 
his work on stages of processing, although he focuses on the implications for price rigidity rather 
than any asymmetry issues in his paper. And Madsen and Yang (1998) look at differences in price 
elasticities in channels of distribution with costs of price adjustment to offer an explanation for 
asymmetric pricing. We develop this literature to increase our understanding of the implications of 
costly price adjustment on prices throughout the channel of distribution, and asymmetry.  
We suggest that retail costs of price adjustment may result in asymmetric pricing by 
manufacturers. If retailers face costs of price adjustment, they will not adjust retail prices for small 
changes in wholesale prices. This changes the demand curve faced by the manufacturers. In 
essence, they then see a region of inelastic demand where small wholesale price changes do not 
translate into commensurate retail price changes. The implication is asymmetric for manufacturers – 
it will make small wholesale price increases more profitable because they will not lose customers 
from higher retail prices. Yet, they will find it less profitable to make small wholesale price 
decreases, because these will not translate into lower retail prices, and therefore no extra revenue 
will be generated by these wholesale price cuts.  
For larger wholesale price changes however, retail prices move readily because the cost of 
changing prices is compensated by increases in retailers’ revenue. As a result, wholesale prices 
adjust symmetrically to large changes. To formalize this idea we present an economic model with 
costly price adjustment in a distribution channel where members have rational expectations because 
they are forward looking and therefore behave with foresight. Using the model we derive testable 
predictions about patterns of wholesale price adjustment.  
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In order to test this theory we need data on upstream prices in a channel where we believe 
price adjustment is costly for the retailer. A natural place to look is in the grocery industry, where 
these costs have been shown to exist (Levy et. al. 1997, 1998; Dutta et. al.1999). Specifically, we 
use the Dominick's scanner data set because it has a measure of upstream prices that the retailer paid 
for its products (wholesale prices), and because the existence of retail costs of price adjustment in 
this industry has been documented in the earlier studies. The data consist of up to 400 weekly 
observations of this measure of wholesale prices in 29 different product categories, covering the 
period of about eight years between 1989 and 1997.  
We conduct the analysis for each of the 29 categories and find almost uniform support for our 
theoretical propositions – asymmetry in the small, but symmetry in larger wholesale price changes. 
In order to check if our results are due to inflation, we redo each category level analysis, first for 
non-inflationary, and then for deflationary periods in the dataset. In both cases we find our results to 
be robust across the categories considered. Yet, one limitation of the wholesale data in the 
Dominick’s dataset is that the reported numbers are not actual wholesale prices but weighted 
averages of the inventory. Therefore, we also check if the results could be an artifact of the manner 
in which wholesale prices have been calculated, and conclude that this cannot explain our results. 
In the rest of the paper, we first present the model, followed by an account of the data, 
analysis and the results. We then discuss the theoretical and managerial implications for the 
literatures spanning asymmetric pricing, distribution channels and costs of price adjustment. The 
implications for public policy are discussed next. We finish the paper by highlighting the principal 
conclusions, important limitations and opportunities for future research. 
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2. Theoretical Model 
In this section we offer a theory where asymmetric pricing at wholesale level is driven by the 
presence of downstream costs of price adjustment. Thus, at a minimum, we need to consider a 2-
level distribution channel, with pricing decisions for each member, and downstream costs of price 
adjustment.  
Specifically, we model a channel with one manufacturer selling through one retailer to end 
customers. The customer demand is a continuously differentiable function, decreasing in p: D(p), in 
each period. For feasibility, we assume the demand function is such that there is at least one price 
above cost at which demand is positive. We let the manufacturer set the wholesale price wi and 
retailer set the retail price pi in each period i. Both manufacturer and retailer choose prices to 
maximize their profits. To explore price adjustment from one period to the other, we need to 
consider at least two periods. We denote the initial pricing period as t0, where channel members set 
the initial price of the product. The second, or the “adjustment period” is denoted t1. In the 
adjustment period firms will decide whether, and how much, to adjust prices given the costs of price 
adjustment and any changes in market conditions.  
We assume the retailers must bear a fixed cost x whenever they change retail prices. Thus, in 
period t1, if the retailer decides to change prices from those they set in the initial period t0, they must 
incur a cost of x. If the retailer chooses not to adjust prices in period t1, then they do not have to bear 
this cost.  
The manufacturers are also assumed to have a fixed cost y whenever they change wholesale 
prices. They can avoid this cost in period t1 by not changing their t0 period prices.4  
                                                 
4 In the analysis we consider a case with y=0 for expositional simplicity. The general case with y›0 is dealt with in the 
appendix. 
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The impetus for price changes comes from changing market conditions. We focus on changes 
in manufacturers’ costs as a proxy for such an impetus.5 More specifically, the manufacturer faces a 
unit production cost c in the initial period t0, and this cost changes by an amount Δc in the 
adjustment period t1. We assume Δc is a single-peaked symmetric distribution with mean zero.6
In terms of how the channel prices are set in each period we will assume a Stackelberg game 
with the manufacturers as price leaders, i.e. they set wholesale prices anticipating the retailers’ 
reactions to these prices. The retailers then take the wholesale prices as given and set retail prices. 
In setting these prices across periods, we let both the retailer and manufacturer act with foresight, 
i.e. in period t0 both consider the pricing actions they will take in t1.  
In this setup asymmetric pricing occurs when the likelihood of positive price adjustments are 
systematically greater than those of negative ones given similar changes in market conditions. For 
example, given Δc≠0 of a given magnitude, asymmetric pricing is exhibited if the likelihood of 
prices rising following Δc>0 is greater than the likelihood of prices falling following Δc<0. 
Asymmetry is also exhibited if the magnitude of the positive price adjustment is greater than the 
magnitude of the negative adjustment. For Δc=0, asymmetric pricing would be exhibited if the 
likelihood of prices rising is greater than the likelihood of prices falling or remaining the same.  
In the following paragraphs we first set up the general problem. We then explore a model of 
this channel without any costs of price adjustment to illustrate that asymmetric pricing is not a result 
of the vertical separation in a channel setting, per se. Subsequently, we investigate this model with 
only retail costs of price adjustment (x). This illustrates that by itself, costly price adjustment leads 
                                                 
5 There are many other ways market conditions can change. These include changing demand, entry or exit of 
competitors, change in the macro-economy (inflation or recession), change in government regulation (price or produce 
control), as well as acts of God (unseasonal weather patterns) etc. The spirit of these results would remain unchanged, 
regardless of the specific situation. 
6 Note that if there are inflationary trends, the expected value of Δc would be non-zero. So, our results are essentially 
derived for a zero inflation scenario. 
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to price rigidity but not asymmetry. However, this also allows us to illustrate how these downstream 
costs of adjustment, lead to upstream asymmetry in wholesale prices during the adjustment period. 
In the appendix we explore the general model with the manufacturer costs of adjustment (y) to 
investigate its effects on our results.  
2.1 General case of channel with costs of price adjustment  
The retail profit functions in the initial period t0 and in the adjustment period t1 are 
respectively: 
Πr0=Max(p0): {(p0 - w0) D(p0)}  
Πr1=Max(p1,δ): {(p1 – w1) D(p1)-δx} where δ=1 if p1≠p0, otherwise 0  (1) 
Similarly, the manufacturer profit functions are respectively: 
Πm0=Max(w0): {(w0- c) D(p0)}  
Πm1=Max(w1,δ): {(w1- c - Δc) D(p1)-δy} where δ=1 if w1≠w0, otherwise 0.  (2) 
where, wi and pi are the wholesale and retail prices in period i and Πmi, Πri being the corresponding 
profits. 
Both the manufacturer and retailer maximize total profits over the two periods. We assume 
that the feasibility conditions of profit maximization are satisfied, i.e. positive profit maximizing 
prices are feasible and that demand is positive at such prices. 
The retailer and the manufacturer must take their expected t1 period solutions into account, in 
solving for their initial (t0) period prices. These t0 prices are then considered when solving for the 
adjustment (t1) period prices. Our solution process therefore, is to proceed backward by first solving 
for the t1 period prices w1 and p1, given the t0 prices p0 and w0. We then derive the equilibrium t0 
prices using the t1 period solutions. The equilibrium t1 prices can then be obtained by substituting 
these t0 solutions.  
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Additionally, in each period, we solve for the prices in a Stackelberg fashion where the 
manufacturer takes into account the retail reaction function p(w) in setting its wholesale price. For 
example, the t0 period solutions are derived in two stages.  
First, the retail reaction function p0(w0) is obtained from:7  
Max(p0; p1e): {(p0 – w0) D(p0)}+{(p1e – w1e) D(p1e)}      (3) 
where, p1e=p0+Δpe and w1e=w0+Δwe, the superscript “e” denoting the prices expected by the retailer 
in the adjustment period. Next, this is substituted into the manufacturer problem to solve:  
Max(w0; w1e): {(w0– c) D(p0(w0)}+{(w1e– c –E(Δc)) D(p1e)}   (4) 
where, E(Δc) is the expectation of Δc based on the distributional assumptions made earlier. 
Having set up the general problem, we now consider below the implications for asymmetric 
pricing.  
2.2 Channel pricing without costs of price adjustment 
We begin by exploring the pricing decisions of channel members when there are no costs of 
price adjustment (x=0, y=0).  
Adjustment Period t1
With no costs of price adjustment in t1, from (1), δ is not a factor in the retail problem. Hence 
the initial period price has no affect on the adjustment period solutions and we can directly solve for 
the equilibrium adjustment period prices. The retailer sets p to maximize (p-w1)D(p), which gives 
the retailer’s price reaction function p1(w1) that solves: 
1
1
111 11
s.t)()(
rε
w
p.wpwp −==  where p
Dwrr log
log)( 111 ∂
∂−== εε    (5) 
                                                 
7 We do not include a discount factor for the second period profits. Such a factor does not affect our central results but 
makes the notations more complex. 
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Similarly, from (2), the manufacturer sets w to maximize {(w-(c+Δc)) D(p1(w))}. This gives 
the wholesale price w1* which solves:8
w = 
111 m
cc
ε−
Δ+ , where 
w
Dwpmm log
log))(( 111 ∂
∂−== εε      (6) 
The equilibrium retail price p1* is then given by: p1* = p1(w1*). 
From (5) and (6), in equilibrium,  
)11( * 1
*
1
m
ccw ε−
Δ+=  and 
)11)(11( * 1
*
1
*
1
mr
ccp εε −−
Δ+=       (7) 
Initial Period t0 
In the initial period, since there are no costs of price adjustment, neither the manufacturer nor 
retailer needs to take into account the impact of initial pricing decisions on later adjustment period 
actions. The maximization problems therefore become identical to that of the adjustment period 
except that costs will be c+E(Δc) rather than c+Δc. By our distributional assumption of Δc, 
E(Δc)=0. Hence the equilibrium solutions with the appropriate notations are: 
)11( * 0
*
0
m
cw ε−=  and )11)(11( * 0*0
*
0
mr
cp εε −−=       (8) 
Notice from (7) that both w1* and p1* exhibit symmetric pricing pattern – both negative and 
positive cost changes of similar magnitudes elicits the same magnitude of wholesale and retail price 
changes. Hence, the channel per se does not lead to any asymmetric price adjustment.  
2.3 Channel pricing with Downstream Costs of Price Adjustment  
Consider now the case, when we allow for downstream costs of price adjustment, x in the 
earlier set up. In the context of the vertical separation of a distribution channel, these costs lead to 
asymmetric adjustment of prices. For ease of exposition, we keep y=0 in the following discussion. 
                                                 
8 Subsequently, the superscript “*” will be used to denote equilibrium solutions. 
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When x>0, the price adjustment decision of the retailer changes. In the adjustment period t1, the 
retailer will not change prices unless market forces change sufficiently to make such price 
adjustment worthwhile. 
Adjustment Period t1
The retailer’s objective function in t1, given the initial pricing decision p0 is: 
Πr1=Max(p,δ): {(p – w1) D(p)-δx } where δ=1 if p1≠p0, otherwise 0   (9) 
Here it incurs a cost x when it changes price (δ=1) from the t0 period price p0. When it does 
not change price (δ=0), it does not incur this cost. 
The solutions are obtained first by solving for δ=1 and then for δ=0. In the first case, x is a 
fixed exogenous parameter, and does not affect the first order conditions. So the retailer’s desired 
price in the adjustment period is the same as previously solved in (7). The retailer’s solution is a 
price reaction function p1(w1) that solves: 
1
1
111 11
w
s.t.)w()w(
r
ppp ε−== , where p
D
rr log
log)w( 111 ∂
∂−== εε    (10) 
Now, the retailer will implement a new price (δ=1) only if by doing so it is going to be better 
off than by staying at p0. Therefore, it will not change price (δ=0) if: (p1(w1)-w1)D(p1(w1))–x≤(p0-
w1)D(p0). The retailer’s solution therefore is: 
⎩⎨
⎧ Γ=
otherwise
xpwpif
p
wp
wp
),),(()(
)( 011
0
11
11       (11) 
where, Γ(p1(w1),p0,x) denotes that the following condition is satisfied:  
{ΠR(p1(w1))–x > ΠR(p0)}, with ΠR(p) = (p–w)D(p).  
ΓC(•) therefore denotes complementary condition: {ΠR(p1(w1))–x ≤ ΠR(p0)} (12) 
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To solve the manufacturer problem, recall from (7) that if the retailer reacts to the 
manufacturer’s price change, the optimal wholesale price will be 
)11( 1
1
m
ccw ε−
Δ+= . But the existence 
of downstream costs of price adjustment creates a region defined by ΓC(•) above, where the retailer 
does not change its own price. Hence demand would be inelastic to any wholesale price change in 
that region and the manufacturer will not find it optimal to price as in (7). For wholesale price 
changes where Γ(•) is satisfied however, the retailer will change its price and the manufacturer will 
find it optimal to price as in (7). Taking this into account the manufacturer’s wholesale pricing 
decision in the adjustment period is:  
⎩⎨
⎧
Δ+−=
ΓΔ+−==
otherwisepDccww
xpwpifwpDccww
w
w
w
)())(((Argmax
),),(())(())(((Argmax
011
01111
1    (13) 
Since δ≠0, from (9), the t1 period solutions are a function of the t0 period prices. We therefore 
first solve for the t1 prices given the t0 prices p0 and w0. Subsequently, the t0 solutions p0* and w0* 
are derived by incorporating the t1 results. These are substituted back, to get the final t1 solutions p1* 
and w1*. In the following we discuss these price adjustment decisions. 
Retailer price adjustment decision – Rigidity, but not Asymmetry 
Equation (11) implies that there exists a region of small wholesale price changes around zero 
where retail prices are rigid. To see this, consider the retail solution in (11). Substituting w0* and p0*, 
the ΓC(p1(w1),p0,x) condition can be written as {ΠR(p1(w1))–x ≤ ΠR(p0*)} or (p1(w1)-w1)D(p1(w1))-
x≤(p0*-w1)D(p0*). Substituting w1=w0*+Δw and rearranging: (p1(w1)-w0*)D1-(p0*-w0*)D0+(D0-D1)Δw 
-x≤0, where D0=D(p0*) and D1=D(p1(w1)). 
 13
Now, let K=(p1(w1)-w0*)D1-(p0*-w0*)D0. It must be the case that K<0. This is because p0* 
being the profit maximizing price; the profit (p0*-w0*)D0 must be greater than profit determined by 
any other retail price. Therefore, rewrite the ΓC(•) condition as: -|K|+(D0-D1)Δw -x≤0 
For Δw=0: the condition is identically satisfied. 
For Δw>0: by assumptions of a well behaved profit function, p1(w1)>p0*. Consequently, 
D0>D1, since the demand function is downward sloping. We can then rewrite the ΓC(•) condition as: 
-|K|+|(D0-D1)|Δw -x≤0. Clearly therefore, there exists a 0
||
||
10
>−
+=Δ
DD
xKwr  such that the ΓC(•) 
condition is satisfied only if Δw≤Δwr.  
For Δw<0: by similar logic as above, p1(w1)<p0* and consequently, D0<D1. The ΓC(•) 
condition can then be rewritten as: -|K|-|(D0-D1)|Δw -x≤0. Therefore, there exists a 
0
||
||
10
<−
+−=Δ
DD
xKwr  such that the ΓC(•) condition is satisfied only if Δw≥Δwr.  
Taken together, the ΓC(•) condition implies a region of small wholesale price changes where 
the retailer does not change its price. This is given by -|Δwr|≤Δw≤|Δwr| where, 
|))(()(|
|)()())(())((|
11
*
0
*
0
*
0
*
011
*
011
wpDpD
xpDwpwpDwwpwr −
+−−−=Δ     (14) 
Since the retail reaction function is of the form 
1
*
0
1 11
)(
r
ww
wp ε−
Δ+=Δ , this region of price rigidity 
still does not suggest asymmetry. In fact, when |Δw|>|Δwr|, the retail price adjustment is symmetric 
in that both negative and positive Δw will elicit matching positive and negative retail price 
adjustments. If we abstract away from the channel and look at the price adjustment decisions of the 
retailer as an individual economic agent, we are led to conclude that while it leads to price rigidity, 
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price adjustment cost per se does not lead to asymmetric pricing. This is a standard result in the 
costs of adjustment literature (cf. Carlton, 1986; Danziger, 1987; Kashyap, 1995 etc.). 
Manufacturer decision – Asymmetry 
When the retail solutions are folded back into the manufacturer problem, the region of retail 
rigidity can now be obtained as -|Δwr*|≤Δw*≤|Δwr*| where, 
|)()(|
|)()()()(|
*
1
*
0
*
0
*
0
*
0
*
1
*
0
*
1*
pDpD
xpDwppDwpwr −
+−−−=Δ      (15) 
Substituting this, the manufacturer solution is: 
⎩⎨
⎧
Δ−−=Δ≤Δ
Δ+=Δ>Δ=  
)()(Argmax where|,|||
 where|,|||
*
011
***
11
*
01
***
1
1 pDccwwwwifw
wwwwwifw
w
w
*
r
**
r   (16) 
Notice in solving for w11* that demand D(p0*) is unaffected by changes in wholesale costs. 
Consequently, the maximization problem reduces to one of maximizing w, which gives 
w11*=w0*+|Δwr*| as the solution. 
Consider now the nature of the region defined by |Δw*|≤|Δwr*|. First, note that Δw* is the 
wholesale price adjustment that the manufacturer would make in the absence of any retail costs of 
price adjustment. Now, if Δc=0, we have Δw*=0 and therefore, w1*=w0*. Therefore, 
since
)11( * 1
*
1
m
ccw ε−
Δ+= , we can write 
)11( * 1
*
m
cw ε−
Δ=Δ . Since (1-1/εm1*)>0, |Δw*|≤|Δwr*| can now be 
rewritten in terms of Δc as:  
-|Δcr|≤Δc ≤|Δcr| where |Δcr|=|Δwr*|(1-1/εm1*)      (17) 
Substituting this, the manufacturer solutions can now be expressed as: 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
Δ≤Δ≤Δ−Δ+
Δ>Δ−
Δ+
=
||||||
||||
)11(
**
0
*
11
rrr
r
m
cccifww
ccifcc
w ε       (18) 
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Consider the implication of the above solution for wholesale prices. For changes in costs that 
are large, whether positive or negative – i.e. when |Δc|>|Δcr|, we have symmetric adjustment because 
wholesale price changes by commensurate amounts in either directions.  
However, for changes in costs that are small, i.e. in the range -|Δcr|≤Δc≤|Δcr|, we have 
asymmetric adjustment. The asymmetry can be seen from the following: when the cost change is 
non-negative (0≤Δc≤Δcr), the wholesale price goes up by the amount |Δwr*| but when the cost 
change is negative (-Δcr≤Δc<0), not only does the wholesale price not come down, but it actually 
increases by the same magnitude. To relate it back to our earlier definitions of asymmetry – given 
identical magnitudes of small positive and negative cost changes in the range -|Δcr|≤Δc≤|Δcr|, the 
likelihood of prices rising following Δc≥0 is greater than the likelihood of prices falling following 
Δc<0.  
The asymmetry above is driven by the retail costs of price adjustment, x and the concomitant 
retail rigidity. If the manufacturer knows that the retailer’s price adjustment is costly, it will have an 
incentive to raise wholesale prices, and a disincentive to lower them, in the region of rigidity for the 
retailers. The incentives these retail costs of price adjustment create for asymmetric pricing by 
manufacturers is the heart of our argument in this paper. 
Initial Period t0
In the initial period the retailer’s solution would take into account the expected wholesale 
prices in the next period, w1e=w0+Δwe. In equilibrium, w1e=w0*+|Δwr*|. The retailer changes price in 
t1 only if |Δw|>|Δwr*|, otherwise its price remains unchanged. Hence, the retailer solves for the price 
that will maximize profits over the two periods t0 and t1 as per the following: 
Πr= Maxp{(p-w0*) D(p(w)) + (p-w0*-|Δwr*|) D(p(w))}    (19) 
The solution gives p0* which gives:  
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The forward looking retailer therefore compensates for its cost of adjustment by charging 
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 more in the initial period than what it would charge if it did not have any such costs. 
To derive the manufacturer price w0*, we fold the retail solution into the manufacturer 
problem. Now, the manufacturer’s wholesale prices change in both directions in t1 only for large 
enough cost changes (|Δc|>|Δcr|). For smaller cost changes however, wholesale prices change only 
upwards, by |Δwr*|. In fact, this is true even if there is no change in costs. Since E(Δc)=0, in 
equilibrium, the manufacturer solution must incorporate this upwards adjustment in t1.  
To set w0* therefore, the manufacturer maximizes over the two periods as:  
Πm= Maxw{(w-c) D(p0(w)) + (w+|Δwr*|-c) D(p0(w))}    (21) 
The solution gives,  
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 less than the price that would be 
if there were no costs of price changes in the channel.  
To summarize, the equilibrium channel prices are: 
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In the adjustment period, for retail prices, the solutions imply symmetric adjustment for large 
cost changes (|Δc|>|Δcr|), but rigidity when cost changes are small enough (-|Δcr|≤Δc≤|Δcr|). For 
wholesale prices however, the implications are different. While, for large cost changes, the 
adjustments are symmetric, for small changes we now have asymmetry. Retailers take this into 
account in setting their initial prices and manufacturers take retailers into account in setting the 
initial wholesale price as well. Thus we have rational expectations for all channel participants.  
The above discussions lead to the following research proposition: 
Proposition 1: There is a range of cost changes for which the manufacturer will 
adjust its wholesale prices asymmetrically. In particular, the manufacturer 
will only adjust its prices upwards regardless of the direction of cost changes, 
in a region of cost changes of small magnitudes: -|Δcr|≤Δc≤|Δcr|. For cost 
changes of larger magnitudes, the wholesale prices will adjust symmetrically. 
We address the consequences of upstream costs of price adjustment, y in the Appendix. These 
costs imply regions of wholesale price rigidity, but not asymmetry. Our main results are robust to 
reasonable specifications of y. More specifically, when y is small relative to x (y‹‹x) and does not 
cause wholesale prices to remain unchanged, the asymmetry results are identical.  
 
3. Empirical Validation 
Our general empirical approach is to test the main implications of the model using upstream 
price data. Typically however, upstream data are difficult to get. Therefore, we first choose a 
context that broadly satisfies some of the key assumptions of the model and then use the available 
scanner data that also has upstream prices. Specifically, we use scanner data from a large Mid-
western supermarket chain.  
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3a. Implications of the Model 
Our theory predicts that for small cost changes (indirectly observed by small wholesale 
changes) wholesale prices are more likely to change in the positive direction than in the negative, 
but for large cost changes (indirectly observed by large wholesale changes) wholesale prices should 
not exhibit any such systematic pattern. It follows, therefore, that positive wholesale price changes 
are more likely than negative wholesale price changes when the magnitude of change is small but 
they are equally likely when the magnitude of change is large. In other words, wholesale prices will 
exhibit asymmetry in the small but not in the large. 
Moreover, recall that our results were derived in the absence of inflationary trends. Therefore, 
this pattern should be independent of inflation. In other words, we expect that the pattern of 
asymmetry in the small will be observed in non-inflationary periods as well.9 The availability of 
data that cover a long time span enables us to examine this implication by separating the data into 
inflation-period, low-inflation-period, and deflation-period sub-samples. 
3b. Data 
To examine the empirical validity of the model’s implications, we use data from Dominick’s 
Finer Food (DFF), which is one of the largest retail supermarket chains in the larger Chicago 
metropolitan area, operating 94 stores with a market share of about 25 percent. Large multi-store 
U.S. Supermarket chains of this type made up about $310,146,666,000 in total annual sales in 1992, 
which was 86.3% of total retail grocery sales (Supermarket Business, 1993). In 1999 the retail 
grocery sales has reached $435 billion. Thus the chain we study is a representative of a major class 
of the retail grocery trade.  Moreover, Dominick’s type multi-store supermarket chains’ sales 
                                                 
9 Note that we abstain from defining what might constitute a “small” price change because its precise magnitude will 
vary with the size of the price adjustment cost as well as with various demand factors. Instead, we focus on what it 
implies in terms of the observable behavior of the wholesale price by letting the data tell us what may constitute a 
“small” price change. See the discussion in the results’ section below.  
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constitute about 14 percent of the total retail sales of about $2,250 billion in the US. Since retail 
sales account for about 9.3 percent of the GDP, our data set is a representative of as much as 1.28 
percent of the GDP, which seems substantial. Thus the market we are studying has a quantitative 
economic significance as well. 
The data consist of up to 400 weekly observations of wholesale prices covering the period 
from September 14, 1989 to May 8, 1997.10 The length of individual product’s price time series, 
however, varies depending on when the data collection for the specific category began and ended. 
Note that Dominick’s UPC-level database does not include all products the chain sells. The 
database includes 29 different product categories, representing approximately 30 percent of 
Dominick’s revenues (see Table 4).11
Dominick’s sets its prices on a chain-wide basis at the corporate headquarters, but there may 
still be some price variation across the chain’s stores depending on the competitive market structure 
in and around the location of the individual stores (Levy, et al., 2002, Dutta et al., 2002). According 
to Barsky et al. (2003), Dominick’s in general maintains three price zones depending on the local 
market conditions. For example, if a particular store of the chain is located in the vicinity of a Cub 
Food store, then the store may be designated a “Cub-fighter” and as such, it may pursue a more 
aggressive pricing policy in comparison to the stores located in other zones.  In the analysis 
described below we have used all the data available from all stores. 
The wholesale price data we have is not direct. Rather, they are calculated indirectly, from the 
retail prices reported in the chain’s scanner database, which are the actual retail transaction prices 
(i.e., the price customers paid at the cash register each week), and the profit margin the supermarket 
makes on each product. Thus, the wholesale price series we use are calculated according to the 
                                                 
10 The wholesale prices here are the Average Acquisition Costs (AAC) – see a later section for a discussion. 
11 Note that the data for Beer and Cigarette categories may be problematic. Unlike the others, they are subject to various 
kinds of tax rules and government regulations such as restrictions on sales and promotional practices. We nevertheless 
present the results for all 29 categories for the sake of completeness. 
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formula Pw = (1 – m) Pr, where Pw denotes the wholesale price, m denotes the gross margin 
measured as a percentage of the retail price, and Pr denotes the retail price.12
3c. Relevance of the Empirical Context 
Before discussing the data analysis results, let us briefly consider the similarity of the data we 
are studying – wholesale price data, and their source – a large retail supermarket chain, to the 
environment envisioned by the model described in the theoretical section of the paper. In particular 
we want to assess the empirical validity of some of the assumptions on which the model is based. 
The first assumption of the model is that the retailer faces costs of price adjustment. How 
valid is this assumption? In a recent series of papers, a group of scholars from marketing, 
economics, and organizational behavior, study price change process and its cost at five large US 
supermarket chains each operating between 100 to over 1,000 stores, and demonstrate “…that 
changing prices in these establishments is a complex process, requiring dozens of steps, and non-
trivial amount of resources” (Levy, et al., 1997, p. 791). They provide direct measures of these 
costs, finding that they lead to over $100,000 per store annually (over 35 percent of the net margin) 
at major grocery chains like the one examined in this study.13 Slade (1998) also estimates these 
costs to be as high as $2.72 per price change in grocery store chains of similar characteristics. Thus, 
it has been documented in these studies that retail supermarket chains not only face costs of price 
adjustment, but that the costs are quite substantial.  
A second assumption concerns the relative magnitudes of the manufacturer and retailer costs 
of price adjustment (y<<x). Although manufacturers also face costs of price adjustment, they may 
not be as substantial in this industry because of the Robinson-Patman act. This requires that all 
                                                 
12 The dataset reports the variable “profit” which is defined as “the gross margin in percent that DFF makes on the sale 
of the UPC.” See Peltzman (2000) page 501 for a discussion.  
13 The follow-up studies by Levy, et al. (1998), Dutta, et al. (1999), and Zbaracki, et al. (2002), which explore other 
retail and wholesale settings, further confirm and reinforce the original findings. See also Blinder, et al. (1998). 
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retailers have access to the same terms and conditions for goods of like grade and quality. Branded 
consumer packaged goods are often of like grade and quality in this industry (for consumer and 
logistical reasons). As such, much of the manufacturer pricing is setting the schedule that all 
retailers have access to. Although this may require a large amount of resources in aggregate, the 
costs for any particular retailer would be minimal.14  
Our third assumption is about the fixed nature of the costs of price adjustment. In this regard 
we have followed the existing theoretical studies of costly price adjustment models, which typically 
treat the costs as fixed.15 But more importantly, the studies by Levy, et al. (1997, 1998), Dutta, et al. 
(1999) and Slade (1998) find that the price adjustment costs the supermarkets face are indeed 
fixed.16 In fact, Slade (1998) estimates that the magnitude of the fixed component of theses costs 
exceed that of any variable component by a magnitude of about fifteen times. According to Levy et 
al. (1997), the major steps required to change shelf prices include: tag change preparation, tag 
change itself, tag change verification, and resolution of price mistakes at the store, zone or corporate 
level (pp. 798-799; also see their Figure 1). Therefore, many of the cost components, such as the 
labor time spent during the price tag change process, the cost of printing and delivering new price 
tags, and the cost of the in-store supervision time, do not change with the size of price change. 
Thus, our assumption that price adjustment costs the supermarkets face are fixed (as opposed to 
convex), is consistent with the existing evidence on the nature of such costs in the retail 
supermarket setting.17
                                                 
14 See Levy et al. (1997) for a discussion of the impact of centralized pricing to reduce the costs of price adjustment. 
15 See, for example, Mankiw (1985) and Danziger (1987). 
16 Alternatively, these costs could vary with the size of price change (i.e., the bigger the price change, the larger is its 
cost), which is known as “convex price adjustment cost.” 
17 However, these costs of price adjustments could be a function of such variables as market share of the products, 
whether a brand is a national brand or private label, and whether item pricing law is required in the areas where the 
retailer is operating (Levy et. al. 2003). Examining how retailer’s menu cost varies with these variables and its 
implications on asymmetric pricing are interesting avenues for future research. We thank an anonymous reviewer for 
pointing us in that direction. 
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Our fourth assumption is that the manufacturers are aware of the existence of the retail price 
adjustment costs. This assumption seems reasonable. The retail price change processes and 
procedures are common knowledge amongst the practitioners. For example, dozens of articles have 
been published in numerous trade publications covering the supermarket industry on electronic 
shelf label systems and how can they reduce the price adjustment costs faced by retail supermarket 
chains, especially in states with item pricing laws. Moreover, many manufacturers of direct store 
delivery products are themselves engaged in price change management and implementation in these 
retail stores. These manufacturers are, therefore, intimately familiar with price adjustment 
complexities and their costs. 
Finally, we believe the assumption on demand stability is also reasonable. Most of the product 
categories included in our data set are mature categories, which have likely reached the limit of their 
market growth. Moreover, most of the products in these categories are staple goods, which suggest 
that large demand variations, which would be typical to fashion or fad goods, are unlikely.18
3d. Empirical Findings 
Below we analyze the predictions of our theory for the entire data set as well as for each of 
the individual categories. In each case, we consider the entire sample period as well as two sub-
samples. One sub-sample includes only those weeks in which the monthly inflation rate was below 
0.1 percent, which we call the low-inflation period sample. The other sub-sample includes only 
those weeks in which the monthly inflation rate was zero percent or less, which we call the deflation 
period sample. For each sub-sample, we first consider price changes in cents (i.e. in absolute terms 
and then in percent (i.e. in relative terms).19
                                                 
18 See Cagan (1974), Roll (1984), and Dutta, et al. (2002). 
19 The statistical analysis of these various combinations of sample periods/categories/units of measurement has yielded a 
total of 180 tables of 50 rows each (29 categories+1 all categories combined x 3 samples/sub-samples x 2 units of 
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Analysis of the Data for the Entire Sample Period 
Recall that according to our theory, we expect to see more positive price changes “in the 
small.” That is, we expect to see more small price increases than decreases. However, as the 
magnitude of the price change gets larger, we expect these differences to disappear. 
The question that naturally arises is what we mean by “small?” Because the answer is not 
obvious, we have chosen to let the data tell us what may constitute a “small” price change in this 
market. To accomplish this, we have calculated the frequency of positive and negative price 
changes for each possible size of price change in cents, 1 cent, 2 cents, 3 cents, etc., up to 100 cents, 
as well as in percents, 1 percent, 2 percent, 3 percent, etc., up to 100 percent. The results are 
displayed in Figures 1–3 and Tables 1–3, corresponding to the entire sample, the low inflation sub-
sample, and the deflation sub-samples, respectively. 
In Figure 1 we report the frequency of positive and negative price changes found in the entire 
Dominick’s database of wholesale prices, that is, when we use all available wholesale price series 
for all products and all 29 categories, during the entire 8-year sample period. Figure 1(a) displays 
the frequency of price changes in cents while Figure 1(b) displays the frequency of price changes in 
percents. 
According to Figure 1a, indeed, for small price changes we find systematically more price-
increases than decreases. The difference appears particularly large for price changes of up to about 
30 cents. Beyond that, the difference between the frequency of positive and negative price changes 
quickly disappears as the size of price changes increases. In fact, the two series become virtually 
indistinguishable beyond that point, at least visually. According to Table 1a, the frequency of price 
increases exceeds the frequency of price decreases in statistical terms as well: the higher frequency 
                                                                                                                                                                  
measurement = 180). While these tables are too many to be included even in the referee’s appendix, they are available 
to interested readers on request. 
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of positive price changes is systematically significant for absolute price changes of up to 36 cents. 
Beyond that the two series crisscross each other without any systematic pattern. 
A similar pattern is observed when we consider the frequency of price changes in relative 
terms, i.e., in percents. For price changes of up to about 8–10 percent, we indeed see more price-
increases than decreases. Beyond that point the two series do not exhibit a clear systematic pattern, 
as they crisscross each other. Further, the differences between positive and negative price changes 
slowly disappear. According to the figures in Table 1b, the higher frequency of positive price 
changes is systematically significant for relative price changes of up to 8 percent. Beyond that the 
two series crisscross each other without any systematic pattern. Thus, the results we find in terms of 
both absolute as well as relative terms are consistent with the model’s prediction: for small price 
changes there are more price increases than decreases. The asymmetry disappears, for larger price 
changes. 
Next we consider the behavior of the wholesale price data for individual categories. We 
looked at the frequency of negative and positive price changes first as a function of the size of price 
change in cents, and then in percents.20  
We find that, the frequency of positive price changes exceeds the frequency of negative price 
changes “in the small” for all 29 categories displayed.  For most categories, the difference appears 
particularly strong for price changes of up to 10-15 cents. Beyond that the two time series exhibit a 
very similar behavior, often merging with each other. We have conducted formal statistical 
significance tests for each of the 29 individual categories, and they confirm our interpretation of the 
results:  the frequency of positive price changes exceeds the frequency of negative price changes for 
all 29 categories included in our sample. According to these tests, for most categories the 
                                                 
20 Only the plots for Toothpastes are given in Figure 5. Due to sheer volume, the rest of the category level plots are 
included in the technical appendix available at the Marketing Science website. 
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asymmetry holds for absolute price changes of between 5–20 cents. Table 4 reports these cutoff 
points for each category. 
Now consider the price change behavior in percents. We find that for all categories considered 
(the category of Beer being the only exception), the frequency of positive price changes exceeds the 
frequency of negative price changes “in the small.” In most cases, “small” visually appears to mean 
about 5–8 percent change. The results of a formal statistical testing of the hypothesis of asymmetry 
confirm this conclusion: they indicate that the asymmetry in relative terms holds for price changes 
in the range of 2–9 percents with the majority of the categories falling in the range of 5–8 percent. 
Table 4 reports these cutoff points for each category. Thus, the analysis of asymmetry in relative 
terms reveals a greater homogeneity across the 29 product categories. Overall, we conclude that the 
wholesale prices of every product category exhibit asymmetric pricing in the small, in both absolute 
and relative terms. 
Analysis of the Data for Low Inflation and Deflation Periods 
A possible criticism of the findings we have reported so far, however, is the fact that during 
the sample period covered in this study, US was experiencing inflation. In Figure 4 we plot the 
monthly inflation rate in the US as measured by the Producer Price Index. We use the Producer 
Price Index because it is likely to be a better indicator of the wholesalers’ costs than the more 
commonly used Consumer Price Index. Given that during the period we study there was inflation in 
the US, it is possible that the finding we are documenting is merely a reflection of that fact. That is, 
during inflation period, even if prices go up and down, we would expect that ceteris paribus, prices 
will go up more often than down. 
One possible answer to this criticism, however, is that if the reason for the asymmetry we are 
documenting is inflation, then we should see more positive than negative price changes not only “in 
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the small” but also “in the large.” As discussed above, however, the data do not indicate such an 
asymmetry. 
A direct, and perhaps more methodical, response to the above criticism can be given by 
conducting the following analysis. Let us try and see whether the asymmetric pricing we document 
“in the small” for the entire sample period, also exists in the data when the observations pertaining 
to the inflationary periods are excluded from the analysis. Given our large sample of observations, 
such an analysis is possible. 
We have conducted two versions of such an analysis. In the first, we included only those 
observations during which the monthly Producer Price Index inflation rate did not exceed 0.1 
percent, a very low inflation rate by any historical standard. We call this a low/zero inflation 
sample. In the second version, we took an even more conservative stand by including in the analysis 
only these observations in which the monthly inflation rate was zero or negative. We call this a 
deflation period sample. 
In Figures 2a and 2b we report the frequency of positive and negative price changes found in 
the Dominick’s wholesale prices during low/zero inflation periods. In Figures 3a and 3b we report 
the frequency of positive and negative price changes during deflation periods. Figures 2a and 3a 
display the frequency of price changes in cents, and Figures 2b and 3b in percents. In both low 
inflation and deflation periods, our substantive conclusions remain the same – we find significantly 
more price increases than decreases for small price changes. For absolute changes, the difference 
appears especially big for price changes of up to about 10–15 cents. For percentage changes the 
difference appears large for changes up to about 5 percent. Beyond these, the difference in the 
frequency of positive and negative price changes quickly disappears as the size of price change 
increases. 
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The findings remain unchanged for individual categories as well. The results are very similar 
to the findings reported for the entire data set. With the exception of Beer, the frequency of positive 
price changes exceeds the frequency of negative price changes “in the small” for all others. Formal 
statistical significance tests for each of the 28 categories confirmed that the asymmetry holds for 
absolute price changes of between 5- 20 cents, with the difference being particularly strong between 
10-15 cents. In terms of percentage changes, the asymmetry holds for price changes of 11 percent or 
less, with the majority of the categories falling in the range of 5–8 percent. Beyond these the two 
time series exhibit a very similar behavior, often merging with each other, in both (cents and %) 
cases. Thus, the analysis of asymmetry in relative terms again reveals a greater homogeneity across 
the 29 product categories. Table 4 reports these cutoff points for each category. 
Could the Results be an Artifact of How the Wholesale Prices Are Calculated? 
Yet another criticism of our results could be that our findings are a direct result of the manner 
in which the wholesale prices are calculated.  Our wholesale price, as reported in the Dominick’s 
database, is based on the average acquisition cost (AAC). The AAC per unit is calculated as 
follows: 
{ } { }
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where,  
Purch(t) = Inventory bought in t;  
price(t) = Per unit wholesale price paid in t;  
EndInventory(t-1) = Inventory at end of t-1;  
Sales(t) = Retail sales at t;  
TotalInventory(t) = Total Inventory at t 
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The role of forward buying by retailers 
Can it be claimed that our results could be just an artifact of the manner in which AAC is 
calculated? Manufacturers often inform the retailer in advance of an impending temporary price 
reduction, permitting the retailer to completely deplete its inventory and then “forward-buying” to 
overstock at the lower price (Peltzman, 2000). Since new purchases form a large proportion of the 
total inventory in this case, the large discount shows up as a commensurately large reduction in 
AAC. On the other hand, a retailer buys less when the wholesale price goes up. Consequently, a 
wholesale price increase of the same large magnitude as the decrease considered earlier, will 
translate into a relatively smaller increase in AAC. Ceteris paribus, it is reasonable to expect that 
the observed asymmetry in the small therefore may be driven by such forward buying 
phenomenon.21
In the absence of actual wholesale prices, how do we conduct a direct test to check for the 
above effect? Note that the forward buying rationale suggests that if the manner of calculating AAC 
was the major driver of the observed asymmetry, it should be more pronounced for products that 
are subjected to greater degree of forward buying. For products not subject to major fluctuations in 
its purchases driven by promotional prices, we should expect much lesser degree of such systematic 
distortion. This leads to the following null proposition which holds true if the manner of computing 
AAC was the major driver of our results.22
Forward Buying Proposition: Products subject to greater degree of forward buying 
will exhibit greater asymmetry than products that are subject to lesser degree 
of forward buying. 
Unfortunately, we do not have direct data on the degree of forward buying. However, several 
authors (Hoch and Banerji, 1993; Rao, 1991; Lal, 1990) have suggested that in general, private 
                                                 
21 We thank an anonymous reviewer for alerting us to this potential rival explanation of our results. 
22 This is not to be confused with our theoretical proposition earlier. Here we intend to check if the “null,” (forward 
buying is a key driver of the observed asymmetry), can be rejected in favor of the “alternate” (that it is not). 
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labels are not promoted as heavily, and hence are likely to be forward-bought less than national 
brands.23 Therefore, a comparison of national brands to private labels provides a natural context to 
test the above proposition. In essence, if forward buying is the main driver of our results, the 
predicted asymmetry should be stronger for national brands than for private labels. We therefore 
undertook two additional analyses to explore whether, and to what extent, can our results be 
attributed to the method of computing AAC. In the paragraphs below we discuss the data used for 
the test and briefly summarize the findings. 
National Brand versus Private Label Data 
For the purposes of the test we need data on comparable national brand (NB)-private label 
(PL) product pairs. We base our identification of such NB-PL pairs on a recently published study of 
Barsky, et al (2003), who use the same Dominick’s data to investigate the size of markups for 
nationally branded products sold in the U.S. retail grocery industry. Their measure of markup is 
based on a comparison of the prices of matched pairs of NB-PL products. To implement their 
strategy, therefore, Barsky, et al. (2003) had to identify the product pairs based on several 
comparability criteria, which included, among other attributes, product’s quality, size, packaging, 
etc. For quality comparison, they used Hoch and Banerji’s (1993) PL product quality rankings.  
After filtering out the product pairs that were not comparable for various reasons (for 
example, size differences, quality differences, insufficient number of observations, etc.), Barsky, et 
al. (2003) were left with 231 matched NB-PL product pairs of comparable size and quality, 
covering 19 product categories.24 These categories are Analgesics, Bottled Juices, Cereals, Cheeses, 
                                                 
23 Hoch and Banerji (1993) suggest national brands will promote more to reduce private label market share (page 61). 
Also see Pauwels and Srinivasan (2004). Rao (1991) presents evidence from three product categories that shows private 
labels are promoted less frequently than national brands (Table 1, page 140). Lal (1990) argues based on his theoretical 
model that “…(the private label) has a constant retail price – that is, it is never promoted” (page 433) and that “… (the 
empirical evidence) do not contradict the second hypothesis that the local/store brand is promoted less often than the 
national brands” (page 439). 
24 See Barsky, et al. (2003), Tables 7A.1-7A.19 for a detailed list of the NB-PL product pairs. 
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Cookies, Crackers, Canned Soups, Dish Detergent, Frozen Entrees, Frozen Juices, Fabric Softeners, 
Grooming Products, Laundry Detergent, Oatmeal, Snack Crackers, Tooth Pastes, Toothbrushes, 
Soft Drinks, and Canned Tuna. However, Barsky, et al. (2003) argue that Toothbrushes category is 
an outlier for its unusually high markup ratio, in comparison to the remaining 18 categories. 
Consequently, they omit the Toothbrushes category from much of their analysis.25 Following their 
strategy, therefore, we also exclude the category of Toothbrushes from our analysis, which leaves us 
with 18 categories of matched NB-PL pairs for the analyses. 
The first analysis compared the aggregate asymmetries between national brands and private 
labels. No significant difference was found either in the absolute (cents) or relative (%) asymmetry 
thresholds. We also did not find any statistical difference in the degrees of asymmetry, when we 
considered the difference between the number of positive and negative changes expressed as a 
percentage of the number of positive changes. 
The second analysis compared category level asymmetries between national brands and 
private labels. Again, we found no evidence to suggest that there is a significant difference between 
the two groups either in absolute (cents) or relative (%) terms.26  
Forward-buying is not a key driver of the observed asymmetry in the small  
To conclude, it is unlikely that our empirical results are an artifact of the manner in which the 
wholesale prices have been calculated. We subject the data to a series of tests to check if there are 
patterns consistent with the forward buying hypotheses. None of the analyses, whether descriptive, 
or statistical, provide support for these hypotheses.  
Such a conclusion must however, be tempered with the knowledge that we are after all 
dealing with a derived measure of wholesale prices and a better test of our theory would be with 
                                                 
25 See Barsky, et al., 2003, p. 194. 
26 Details of these tests are in a separate technical appendix available at the Marketing Science website.  
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actual wholesale prices. Unfortunately, such data is not available. We are not unique in dealing with 
this problem. A number of other authors who have dealt with it bemoan the lack of proper 
wholesale price data (cf. Cecchetti, 1986; Peltzman, 2000; Chintagunta, 2002; Levy, et al. 2002; 
Chevalier, et al. 2003 etc.). Creative approaches like estimating wholesale prices from regression 
which is particularly common in the empirical industrial organization literature (see Carlton and 
Perloff, 1994), using aggregate price indexes as a proxy, such as wholesale price index (Cecchetti, 
1986), rough accounting estimates (Nevo, 2001), even simulation (Tellis and Zufryden, 1995) are 
the norm in such cases. Others may ignore explicit consideration of wholesale prices altogether 
(Gerstner et al., 1994; Pesendorfer, 2001).  
While the lack of accurate wholesale price data is unfortunate, we believe that should not 
hinder theory building in the domain of wholesale prices. Nevertheless, the onus is on the researcher 
to ensure that any empirical test of theory using weak wholesale data is actually robust to the 
weakness of the data. It is in that spirit that we conducted these additional checks. 
To keep things in perspective therefore, it is necessary to understand that while we stand 
behind the spirit of our results, we recognize that the verity of the exact magnitudes of the 
asymmetry we report is subject to some uncertainty.  
Overall, by ruling out inflation and forward buying as potential rival explanations of our 
results, we conclude that our theory offers the most consistent explanation of the observed 
asymmetry in the small.27
 
                                                 
27 Other authors using this dataset (e.g. Peltzman, 2000) restrict their sample till September 1994 because of a change in 
manufacturers’ pricing policies from that point in time. To maintain comparability and to rule out this policy change as 
a driver of our results, we conduct an additional analysis by restricting our sample to the pre-September 1994 period. 
The details of this test are in the technical appendix available at the Marketing Science website. Our central result 
remains unaffected by this change, thereby ruling it out as a central driver of our results. We thank an anonymous 
reviewer for suggesting this additional check. 
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4. Discussion 
Our primary goal in this paper is to offer and empirically validate a theory of asymmetric 
pricing. To this end, we offer a channel based theory of asymmetric pricing – that costs of price 
adjustment for downstream channel members can create an incentive for asymmetric pricing by 
upstream channel members. We go on to present evidence of asymmetric wholesale pricing “in the 
small” with symmetric wholesale pricing “in the large,” which is consistent with this theory. To the 
best of our knowledge, no other paper reports such patterns of asymmetries at the wholesale level.  
Theoretically, this paper merges two different lines of research – costs of price adjustment in 
economics and distribution channels in marketing. By themselves, neither implies asymmetry. 
Traditional economic theories based on costs of price adjustment suggest that nominal rigidities are 
usually symmetric, with “prices (responding) similarly to positive and negative shocks” (Ball and 
Mankiw, 1994; p. 247). Similarly, channels of distribution are often argued to be a source of many 
pricing distortions, (e.g. double marginalization – Jeuland and Shugan, 1983; free riding – Bergen 
and John, 1997), but not asymmetry. Taken together however, costs of price adjustment and 
channels of distribution suggest ranges of asymmetric pricing by the upstream firm.  
Since most of the existing research has focused on asymmetric pricing by a single decision 
maker (primarily, the retailer), we expand the scope of asymmetry research by explicitly exploring 
the implications of the business-to-business linkages in a channel. This builds on a long tradition in 
marketing of using the distribution channel to improve our understanding of a variety of marketing 
issues beyond the traditional scope of the channels literature.28.  
By combining a channels perspective with the costs of price adjustment perspective, we 
generate predictions and empirical findings that cannot be easily explained by the existing theories 
                                                 
28 Examples include product introduction and design (Rao and McLaughlin, 1989; Villas-Boas, 1998), unbundling 
(Wilson et al., 1990), advertising (Bergen and John 1997) etc. 
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of asymmetric pricing. For example, asymmetry that is driven by inflation (Ball and Mankiw, 1994) 
cannot account for asymmetry in non-inflationary periods, or deflationary periods that we observe 
in our data. Similarly, market power based explanations for wholesale asymmetry suggest that 
asymmetric adjustments may be a means to extract monopoly rent from retailers (Benabou and 
Gertner, 1993; Borenstein and Shepard, 1996). Yet this does not explain why we observe 
asymmetry in small but not in large wholesale price changes. In the same way, the differences in 
elasticities and costs across levels of the distribution channel, required to explain asymmetry in 
Madsen and Yang (1998), does not explain why asymmetry occurs in the small, but not in the large. 
More generally, Peltzman (2000) concludes, “…attributing asymmetries to imperfect competition is 
unlikely to be rewarding.”  
There are also some promising cross-disciplinary theoretical directions this paper suggests. 
We extend the marketing literature on channels of distribution to explicitly considering the costs of 
price adjustment and its implications on channels pricing behavior. Traditionally, these costs of 
price adjustment have been known as “menu costs” (Ball and Mankiw, 1994) and are associated 
primarily with price rigidity. Although we focus on asymmetric pricing issues, there are many other 
natural applications for marketers to explore. One direction is how these costs of price adjustment 
impact pass-through of manufacturer price changes (cf. Kim and Staelin, 1999; Tyagi, 1999). There 
is a literature in economics called "stages of processing" that is related to channels of distribution. It 
has considered the extent of pass-through in the context of studying price rigidity/flexibility in 
stages of processing, but has not explored price asymmetry. The main focus of these studies has 
been on the effect of the number of stages of processing on the degree of price flexibility. For 
example, Blanchard (1983) focuses on the role of price adjustment costs on the degree of price 
rigidity in markets with a stages of processing structure (which though not identical, quite resembles 
the channels structure), and Basu (1995) who studies the role of price adjustment costs in 
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economies with the input-output structure, which is an alternative way of looking at the 
organization of production in market economies. See also Gordon (1990).   
In expanding the costly price adjustment theory to include channels of distribution, we 
explore how the presence of these costs may fundamentally alter the nature of transactions within 
the channel, as well. The implications are not just price rigidity, which is a direct effect of these 
costs, but asymmetric pricing, which is more strategic in nature. This suggests that this literature 
broaden its consideration to look at the impacts of these costs on the incentives and actions of 
related parties to transactions.  
Empirically, we document systematic evidence of asymmetric pricing that, taken in the 
context of previous empirical research, is particularly surprising. Specifically, Peltzman (2000) 
studies the same Dominick's dataset and reports finding no systematic evidence of asymmetry. Yet, 
our results are actually more complementary than contradictory to Peltzman’s. The key differences 
between the papers are the location and size of asymmetry within the distribution channel. While 
Peltzman looked downstream, we look for asymmetry in upstream channel prices. This in turn 
addresses one of Peltzman’s own conclusions that the “vertical market linkages” of a distribution 
channel may be key factors in asymmetric adjustment. Additionally, Peltzman looks for asymmetry 
overall, both the large and the small without distinguishing between the two. Our results suggest the 
need to consider differences in asymmetry within the magnitude continuum as well. 
Finally, our paper has public policy implications. Generally speaking, marketing scholars over 
the years have consistently called for greater involvement of marketers in shaping public policy (cf. 
Alderson, 1937; Guiltinan and Gundlach, 1996). More specifically, policy implications of pricing 
strategies have been a central concern for a number of marketing researchers (Gerstner and Hess, 
1990; Wilkie et al., 1998 etc.). Yet, the literature is relatively sparse and in a recent editorial, 
Grewal and Compeau (1999) point out that, “…(there is a need for)… marketing researchers to 
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examine the public policy issues raised by the strategic pricing practices firms employ.” 
Asymmetric pricing is such a strategy and has not escaped the view of policy makers who worry 
about prices that are too quick to rise, but are not clear about the central causes. This is evidenced in 
headlines such as: “California politicians ask for price caps on electricity” (CNN.com, May 22, 
2001), or in comments such as US Vice President Dick Cheney’s: “We get politicians who want to 
go out and blame somebody and allege there is some kind of conspiracy, instead of dealing with the 
real issues” (CNN.com, May 22, 2001). Our perspective suggests that there may be asymmetric 
pricing upstream in the channel. But this upstream asymmetry may be bounded by the size of the 
costs of price adjustment of downstream channel members. Any concern with asymmetric pricing 
must therefore factor in the efficiency issues inherent in such costs. For example, asymmetric 
pricing is less likely to be a significant concern for channels that invest in reducing such costs.  
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper is only another step in our understanding of asymmetric pricing. It does suggest 
future theoretical work to explore additional implications of costs of price adjustment on pricing, 
contracting and design of channels of distribution. Presently this theory is only applicable in 
upstream channel pricing. The logic of asymmetric pricing may be extended to retail pricing 
decisions as well. A couple of recent papers (Chen et al. 2004; Müller and Ray, 2003) explore the 
implications for retail pricing decisions. We call for more investigations in the same vein. We did 
not have access to wholesaler’s cost data. If such data were to become available, future empirical 
work could take advantage of it in order to directly assess the implications of this theory. In 
addition, future work could explore the cross-category differences (Hoch et al., 1995) in the extent 
of asymmetry. 
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On another note recall that we show asymmetric adjustment of wholesale prices is a subgame 
perfect equilibrium in a 2-period model. One especially promising area of future theoretical 
research would be to explore the implications for the results if we extend the model to longer time 
horizons. Such an extension can be done in several ways. If we merely extend the game to n 
periods, the results are unlikely to be substantively different from the conclusions we draw from our 
simpler model. However, the outcomes are not intuitive in a model with repeated strategic 
interactions between manufacturers and retailers. In this context, note that a benefit of having 
forward looking retailers in our current model is that – in equilibrium retailers are not disadvantaged 
by asymmetric pricing in the small – they adjust their initial pricing decisions to reflect this 
economic reality. So it is not clear that a richer space of punishments, relationships or prices would 
necessarily be of any improvement to the retailer in this situation. The costs are real, and as such 
any solution would have to factor them into the equilibrium. Nevertheless, while we suspect that 
asymmetry will still be an equilibrium outcome, more rigorous theoretical efforts are needed before 
a definitive answer can be given. 
Finally, we hope this paper reinforces the value of bringing scholars in marketing and 
economics together to study issues of common interest. This paper brings a marketing perspective 
to this dialog by conducting this investigation in the context of a distribution channel and by 
considering store-level marketing data. We believe this is the first paper in marketing to incorporate 
costs of price adjustment explicitly into their analysis. There are a variety of issues in marketing that 
may benefit from a consideration of these costs of price adjustment in the area of pass-through, 
promotional pricing, EDLP, etc. It also brings an economic perspective to this dialogue in the work 
on asymmetric pricing and costs of price adjustment, areas where marketing researchers are relative 
newcomers but may have important insights and evidence to bring to these areas of inquiry. We feel 
both disciplines can benefit greatly from these kinds of cross-disciplinary explorations. 
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APPENDIX 
 
A.0 General case of channel with costs of price adjustment  
The general set up of the model is given in the main body of the paper. The solution proceeds 
by first solving for the t1 prices w1 and p1, given any t0 prices p0 and w0. Subsequently, the t0 results 
are obtained by incorporating the t1 solutions. Substituting these back into the t1 period solutions 
gives the final results. 
Adjustment Period t1
The solutions are obtained first by solving for δ=1 and then for δ=0. In the first case, x is a 
fixed exogenous parameter, and does not affect the first order conditions: Hence, Argmaxp {(p-
w)D(p) –x} = Argmaxp (p-w) D(p). The retailer’s price reaction function p1(w) solves: 
1
1 11
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Now, the retailer will implement a new price (δ=1) only if by doing so it is going to be better 
off than by staying at p0. It will not change price (δ=0) if: (p1(w)-w)D(p1(w))–x≤(p0-w)D(p0). The 
retailer’s solution therefore is: 
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where,  
Γ(p1(w),p0,x) ≡ [ΠR(p1(w))–x > ΠR(p0)] and ΠR(p) = (p–w)D(p).  
The t1 period wholesale prices for the manufacturer is obtained by solving:  
Πm1=Max(w1,δ): {(w1- c - Δc) D(p1)-δy}.      (A-3) 
The manufacturer incurs a cost y when it changes price (δ=1) from w0. When it does not 
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change price, δ=0.  
The manufacturer solutions must also internalize the effects of x. There are three possible 
outcomes. The first is, both the manufacturer and the retailer readjust their prices. The second is, the 
manufacturer does but the retailer does not readjust. The third is, neither readjusts.29  
The wholesale solutions then are expressed as: 
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where, p(w) is the retail reaction function to wholesale prices; 
Γ(p1(w),p0,x) ≡ [ΠR(p1(w))–x > ΠR(p0)]; ΓC(•) ≡ [ΠR(p1(w))–x ≤ ΠR(p0)];  
Φ(w1,w0,p(w),y) ≡ [ΠM(w1)–y > ΠM(w0)]; ΦC(•) ≡ [ΠM(w1)–y ≤ ΠM(w0)];  
ΠR(p) = (p–w)D(p); ΠM(w)=(w–c–Δc)D(p(w));      (A-5) 
w1= Argmaxw{(w-(c+Δc))D(p1(w))} s.t. Γ(p1(w1),p0,x) and Φ(w1,w0,p(w1),y);  
w11= Argmaxw{(w-(c+Δc))D(p0)} s.t. ΓC(p1(w11),p0,x) and Φ(w11,w0,p(w11),y).  
The corresponding retail prices are given by: 
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ywpwwandxpwpif
p
p
p
)),(,,(),),(( 101011
0
1
1     (A-6) 
The Γ and Φ conditions in the first rows of both the manufacturer and retailer solutions can 
now be redefined in terms of the cost changes. In particular, using procedures similar to that used 
earlier in the main paper, we can show the existence of Δcr and Δcm with properties ∂|Δcr|/∂x>0 and 
∂|Δcm|/∂y>0 respectively, such that: 
                                                 
29 The alternative where the retailer readjusts but the manufacturer does not is not feasible in our setup because if the 
wholesale prices do not change, retail prices remain unchanged as well.  
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Γ(•) ⇒ |Δc|>|Δcr| and, Φ(•) ⇒ |Δc|>|Δcm|       (A-7) 
Initial Period t0
The t1 solutions are then incorporated into the t0 problem to solve for p0* and w0*. First, the 
retail reaction function p0(w0) is obtained from:  
Max(p0; p1e): {(p0 – w0) D(p0)}+{(p1e – w1e) D(p1e)}      (A-8) 
where, p1e=p0+Δpe and w1e=w0+Δwe, the superscript “e” denoting the prices expected by the retailer 
in the adjustment period. Next, this is substituted into the manufacturer problem to solve:  
Max(w0; w1e): {(w0– c) D(p0(w0)}+{(w1e– c –E(Δc)) D(p1e)}   (A-9) 
where, E(Δc) is the expectation of Δc based on the distributional assumptions made earlier. 
The solutions p0* and w0* are then substituted back into the t1 solutions to get p1* and w1*. 
With this general problem as the background, we will now consider the role of the upstream 
costs of price adjustment, y for our results.30  
A.1 Pricing with only upstream costs of price adjustment (y>0, x≈0): Rigidity 
We start by exploring the role of y in isolation of any channel effects. For this we set x≈0 and 
let y>0. The results show that y by itself only leads to price rigidity but not asymmetry. Adjustment 
Period t1 
The manufacturer will not implement a new price if it is better off by staying at w0*. Since p0* 
remains the profit maximizing retail price if wholesale prices remain at w0*, the condition when the 
wholesale does not change can be written as: 
)()}({))(()}({ *0
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The equilibrium channel prices can then be expressed as,  
                                                 
30 For ease of exposition and notational economy, we will henceforth derive the t1 period solutions as functions of w0* 
and p0* and solve for the functional forms of w0* and p0* later when solving the t0 period problem. 
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where, w1* solves w = 
111 m
cc
ε−
Δ+ ; p1*=p1(w1*); Φ as defined earlier in (A-5), is given by 
Φ(w1,w0,p(w),y) ≡ [ΠM(w1)–y > ΠM(w0)] with ΠM(w)=(w–c–Δc)D(p(w)).  
Using procedures similar to earlier, it follows from (A-10) and (A-11) that there exists a Δcx0 
with the property ∂|Δcx0|/∂y>0 such that prices are unchanged for |Δc|≤|Δcx0| (A-12) 
Hence the primary contribution of price adjustment costs at the manufacturer end in this setup 
is price rigidity at both wholesale and retail when cost changes are small enough. For |Δc|>|Δcx0|, 
wholesale prices adjust to w1* and retail prices to p1*. Notice that this adjustment pattern is 
symmetric in that both negative and positive Δc will elicit matching positive and negative price 
adjustments. In fact, if we abstract away from the channel and look at the price adjustment decisions 
of an individual economic agent (i.e. when p(w)=w),31 we are led to conclude that while it leads to 
price rigidity, price adjustment cost per se does not lead to asymmetric pricing. This is a standard 
result in the costs of adjustment literature (cf. Carlton, 1986; Danziger, 1987; Kashyap, 1995 etc.). 
Initial Period t0
Now, note that the rigidity imposed by y creates a potential marginal distortion for the 
manufacturer of magnitude |Δcx0|. In this region of small costs changes, there would be no change in 
demand as there would be no change in manufacturer prices. In other words, even if costs were to 
go up by |Δcx0| (with the commensurate negative effect on profits), the manufacturer will not adjust 
its prices in t1. A profit-maximizing manufacturer would incorporate this in its t0 solution. The t0 
solution for manufacturer prices therefore, is obtained by setting E(Δc)= |Δcx0|: 
                                                 
31 Essentially, completely ignoring the existence of the retailer in the above case. 
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Max(w): {(w-c) D(p0*) + (w-c-|Δcx0|) D(p0*)}     (A-13) 
The solution gives w0* which solves:  
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This price would remain in effect in t1 unless |Δc|>|Δcx0|, when as per the t1 period solutions, 
prices will adjust symmetrically. The manufacturer acting in a forward looking manner, therefore, 
compensates for its cost of adjustment by charging ( )0
0
112 m
xc
ε−
Δ
 more in the initial period than what 
it would charge if it did not have any such costs. 
A.2 Pricing with both up- and down-stream costs of price adjustment (y>0, x>0) 
We now consider the more general case discussed earlier (x>0,y>0). This explores how y may 
affect the asymmetry results obtained earlier. The main conclusion is that y implies regions of 
wholesale price rigidity, but not asymmetry. We start by considering the different cases dependent 
on the relative magnitude of y.  
First, for convenience, we present the general solution for period t1 in terms of the ranges of 
cost changes: 
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1. Large y: Rigidity 
Suppose now, y is large (y>>x). In particular, let y be large enough such that |Δcm|≥|Δcr|.32  
Adjustment Period t1
                                                 
32 Recall that ∂|Δcm|/∂y>0. 
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When |Δcm|≥|Δcr| the condition in the second row of the manufacturer solution is not feasible. 
We can then rewrite the equilibrium channel prices in t1 as, 
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Hence, for large y, the main implication of price adjustment costs is still one of rigidity in 
channel prices for small enough cost changes.  
Initial Period, t0
In t0, the retailer solution is simply: *
0
*
0*
0 11 r
w
p ε−= .  
The manufacturer solution on the other hand is obtained in a manner similar to the earlier 
subsection, by considering Δcm instead of Δcx0: 
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2. Small y: Asymmetry  
Let y be small: y<<x. In particular, let y small enough such that |Δcm|<|Δcr|. In this subsection, 
we will first solve the t1 prices and derive the t0 prices for the special cases of different magnitudes 
of y discussed subsequently. 
The t1 equilibrium prices can be derived from (A-4) and (A-15) which are equivalent. From 
(A-15), if |Δcm|<|Δcr|, then |Δc|>|Δcm| is identically satisfied whenever |Δc|>|Δcr| and (w1*,p1*) are the 
equilibrium prices. Then, *
1
*
1 11 m
ccw ε−
Δ+=  is the solution to Maxw{(w-(c+Δc)) D(p1(w))} s.t. 
|Δc|>|Δcr|.  
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From the functional form it is clear that, given small y, for large enough cost changes 
(|Δc|>|Δcr|), the wholesale price here is still symmetric with respect to positive and negative 
directions of cost changes. 
p1* can be obtained from the retail reaction function: *
1
*
1*
1 11 r
w
p ε−= . 
Now, what happens when the costs changes are small – specifically, |Δc|≤|Δcr|? From (A-15) 
w11* is the solution to Maxw{(w-(c+Δc)) D(p0*)}. Using the equivalency between (A-4) and (A-15), 
since demand is independent of w, this maximization boils down simply to maximizing w subject to 
the conditions ΓC(•) and Φ(•) in (A-4). The ΓC(•) implies: (p1*-w11)D(p1*)–x≤(p0*-w11)D(p0*). Using 
procedures similar to that employed earlier, we can express this as  
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Since the maximization exercise involves maximizing the wholesale price, w11*=w0*+|Δwr*| is 
the profit maximizing solution.33 The corresponding Φ condition can therefore be written as 
(w0+|Δwr*|-c-Δc)D(p0*)–y>(w0*-c-Δc)D(p0*) or:  
|Δwr*| D(p0*)>y          (A-19) 
So, as expected, for small cost changes (|Δc|≤|Δcr|), the results predict asymmetry. However, 
this asymmetry appears contingent on certain magnitudes of y. So, now let us consider the 
implication the magnitude of y has on the final solutions.  
Let y*=|Δwr*| D(p0*)          (A-20) 
Case A: y>y*
                                                 
33 w11>w11* is not profit maximizing here. In that case, Δw>Δwr* and the ΓC condition is violated – in other words, the 
retail price will change and our maximization exercise will be different, with w1* as the profit maximizing outcome. 
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Adjustment period t1
If y>y* the corresponding Φ condition (A-19) is always violated (|Δc|≤|Δcm|) and manufacturer 
prices remain unchanged at w0*. Without any change in wholesale prices, the retail prices also 
remain unchanged at p0*.  
Hence, when y is large enough, the results predict rigidity for both upstream and downstream 
prices. 
Initial Period t0
Since |Δcm| represents the marginal distortion due to its costs of price changes, the 
manufacturer sets the w0* that maximizes: 
Πm= Maxw{(w-c) D(p(w)) + (w-c-|Δcm|) D(p(w))}. 
The solution gives: w0* which solves:  
w0*= ( )* 0112
2
m
mcc
ε−
Δ+
, where 
w
Dwpm log
log))(( *000
*
0 ∂
∂−== εε     (A-21) 
As before, the manufacturer, acting in a forward looking manner, therefore, compensates for 
its cost of adjustment by charging ( )* 0112 mm
c
ε−
Δ
 more in the initial period than what it would charge 
if it did not have any such costs.  
p0* is obtained by substituting w0* into the retail reaction function: *
1
*
0*
0 11 r
w
p ε−= . 
Case B: 0≤y≤y*
Adjustment Period t1
If y is quite small, in particular, if y≤y*, the Φ condition (A-19) is identically satisfied for all 
Δc. When (A-19) is thus satisfied, w11*=w0*+|Δwr*| is the solution. 
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The equilibrium channel prices when 0<y≤y* then are: 
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p1* can be derived by substituting w1* in the reaction function: *
1
*
1*
1
*
1 11
)(
r
w
wp ε−= , which would be 
symmetric to any changes in wholesale prices. 
Hence, when y is small enough, the results predict asymmetry for upstream prices. This is 
very similar to the effect illustrated in the main paper. 
Initial Period t0
The initial period solutions are obtained as solved in the main paper. Essentially, the retailer’s 
solution would take into account the expected wholesale prices in the next period. This price would 
remain in effect unless |Δw|>|Δwr*|. The equilibrium retail price at t0 therefore is obtained from:  
Πr= Maxp{(p-w0*) D(p(w)) + (p-w0*-|Δwr*|) D(p(w))}    (A-23) 
The solution gives p0*:  
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To derive the manufacturer prices, we fold the retail solution back into the manufacturer 
problem. In doing so, we consider the magnitude of the expected cost change and the upward 
adjustment of the wholesale prices as discussed earlier in the main body of the paper. To set w0* 
therefore, the manufacturer maximizes over the two periods as:  
Πm= Maxw{(w-c) D(p0(w)) + (w+|Δwr*|-c) D(p0(w))}    (A-25) 
The solution gives,  
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00
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0 ∂
∂−== εε     (A-26) 
These t0 prices remain in effect unless the magnitude of the cost change is large enough 
(|Δc|>|Δcr|) to effect a change in channel prices. 
Consider now the implications of the solutions for channel prices. For retail prices, we still 
predict symmetric adjustment for large cost changes (|Δc|>|Δcr|) but (symmetric) rigidity when cost 
changes are small enough (|Δc|≤|Δcr|). 
For wholesale prices the results are a function of the magnitude of y. When y is large (y>y*), 
we get (symmetric) rigidity for small costs changes (|Δc|≤|Δcr|). When the cost change is large 
enough (|Δc|>|Δcr|), we get symmetric adjustment. When y is small (y≤y*) however, we get 
asymmetry for small costs changes (|Δc|≤|Δcr|) and symmetric adjustment for large ones (|Δc|>|Δcr|).  
The intuition behind the asymmetry results is derived from the impact of the retailer’s costs of 
price adjustment, x and the resulting retail price rigidity. This creates a region of wholesale price 
changes (both positive and negative) where the demand is inelastic, leading to the asymmetric 
adjustment of wholesale prices. The manufacturer costs, y however, does not play any direct role in 
this asymmetry. Its primary role in this setup is to determine when the manufacturer will not find it 
profitable to change its wholesale prices. Since retail prices only change following wholesale price 
changes, this implies that y’s primary contribution is in determining regions of wholesale, and by 
corollary, retail price rigidity.  
Interestingly, wholesale asymmetry (when wholesale price changes in the adjustment period) 
persists even for very small cost changes in spite of the fact that manufacturer costs of price 
adjustment y>0. This happens because, in the region of retail rigidity, the manufacturer can 
compensate y by the increase in profits that follows asymmetric positive adjustment. However, this 
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is only true for small enough y. For large enough y, this asymmetry will not happen because the 
manufacturer cannot compensate y by the increase in profits due to the asymmetric adjustment. If y 
is so large that the manufacturer will implement only a large wholesale price change, we may not 
see any rigidity at retail because the magnitude of wholesale price change may be larger than the 
region of retail rigidity. 
It is worthwhile to note that even if wholesale asymmetry is a direct result of retail rigidity, it 
does not imply that retailers will be taken advantage of. The fact that forward-looking retailers will 
take these costs into account when setting initial and future prices is a standard result in the 
economics literature. In our case, the nature of the expected distortions in the adjustment period, 
introduced by these costs, is incorporated in the initial period prices. 
In conclusion, when y is large (y››x), the main prediction is rigidity in channel prices for small 
enough cost changes. However, generally speaking, y‹‹x.34 In this case, wholesale price changes are 
symmetric with respect to large positive and negative cost changes. However, for small cost 
changes the results predict asymmetry depending on the magnitude of y. Specifically, when y>y* 
where y*=|Δwr*| D(p0*), the results predict rigidity for both upstream and downstream prices. 
However, when y≤y* the results predict asymmetry for upstream prices. This is stated in the 
following research proposition: 
Proposition 1A: When y is small (0<y≤y*), there is a range of cost changes for which 
the manufacturer will adjust its wholesale prices asymmetrically. In 
particular, the manufacturer will only adjust its prices upwards regardless of 
the direction of cost changes, in a region of cost changes of small 
magnitudes: -|Δcr|≤Δc≤|Δcr|. For cost changes of larger magnitudes, the 
wholesale prices will adjust symmetrically. 
                                                 
34 See the empirical section of the main paper for a discussion.  
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Table 1a. All Categories Combined, Entire Sample, Price Changes in Cents 
 
Price Change in Cents Positive Negative Z-Value 
1 2895106 2098539 356.46 
2 1676572 1300313 218.07 
3 1247860 1001943 163.95 
4 986016 810011 131.33 
5 836345 662900 141.65 
6 702145 564634 122.18 
7 619595 514363 98.82 
8 520394 448388 73.16 
9 409297 345331 73.63 
10 357570 305687 63.71 
11 317809 282220 45.94 
12 297657 274928 30.04 
13 283681 255998 37.68 
14 256040 233362 32.42 
15 234609 207550 40.69 
16 204458 194157 16.32 
17 198795 177999 33.88 
18 179168 167727 19.43 
19 182573 172934 16.17 
20 163876 154406 16.79 
21 147867 138684 17.15 
22 140236 136270 7.54 
23 132603 127776 9.46 
24 127366 118553 17.77 
25 132680 127664 9.83 
26 120090 112526 15.68 
27 114587 106147 17.96 
28 98560 94870 8.39 
29 98055 94940 7.09 
30 97295 96314 2.23 
31 89961 89116 2.00 
32 101094 92851 18.72 
33 86914 83416 8.48 
34 85815 81700 10.05 
35 89367 85005 10.45 
36 80315 75532 12.12 
37 85957 88666 -6.48 
38 85041 80912 10.14 
39 78067 72677 13.88 
40 70122 65406 12.81 
41 64565 60255 12.20 
42 63398 61014 6.76 
43 70939 69516 3.80 
44 62361 61711 1.85 
45 60022 59303 2.08 
46 58291 63867 -15.95 
47 51194 51552 -1.12 
48 51733 54594 -8.77 
49 46529 47104 -1.88 
50 45186 46693 -4.97 
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Table 1b. All Categories Combined, Entire Sample, Price Change in Percents 
 
Price Change in % Positive Negative Z-Value 
1 3040097 2369790 288.19 
2 1833178 1467749 201.13 
3 1340358 1117787 141.96 
4 1072180 899292 123.13 
5 765355 668618 80.78 
6 631352 592735 34.90 
7 524601 506774 17.55 
8 480713 452409 29.30 
9 393397 393734 -0.38 
10 351780 362894 -13.15 
11 322287 331016 -10.80 
12 288412 326835 -48.99 
13 280326 291078 -14.22 
14 250000 300384 -67.91 
15 225027 271375 -65.78 
16 242802 249251 -9.19 
17 221687 252551 -44.82 
18 201737 234925 -50.22 
19 180080 214481 -54.77 
20 201395 196250 8.16 
21 160135 192749 -54.90 
22 163640 163501 0.24 
23 144710 152282 -13.89 
24 142030 138348 6.95 
25 123762 126999 -6.46 
26 126984 113861 26.74 
27 116047 111207 10.15 
28 102891 113362 -22.52 
29 97362 118163 -44.81 
30 86047 90755 -11.20 
31 76570 88536 -29.45 
32 77578 79606 -5.12 
33 65036 72268 -19.52 
34 69211 63321 16.18 
35 63195 58258 14.17 
36 60660 54383 18.51 
37 58841 44385 44.99 
38 55280 43987 35.84 
39 53907 38740 49.83 
40 46866 41935 16.55 
41 67823 40201 84.04 
42 43074 35005 28.88 
43 45052 34840 36.13 
44 40879 35856 18.13 
45 41584 39883 5.96 
46 41443 31647 36.23 
47 30251 28806 5.95 
48 29130 31172 -8.32 
49 33433 24716 36.15 
50 28534 27389 4.84 
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Table 2a. All Categories Combined, Low Inflation, Price Changes in Cents 
 
Price Change in Cents Positive Negative Z-Value 
1 1563081 1145605 253.66 
2 901586 703395 156.44 
3 670891 538954 119.95 
4 521048 430541 92.78 
5 449189 356776 102.94 
6 374921 306464 82.93 
7 324646 273707 65.85 
8 276121 244961 43.17 
9 214997 186572 44.86 
10 186824 171666 25.32 
11 166624 152614 24.80 
12 155122 148049 12.85 
13 151697 140288 21.11 
14 132013 121424 21.03 
15 123295 114419 18.20 
16 108076 106859 2.63 
17 102463 95490 15.67 
18 95988 89244 15.67 
19 93151 92083 2.48 
20 83270 82713 1.37 
21 79235 74453 12.20 
22 72416 74441 -5.28 
23 68190 72591 -11.73 
24 66608 62577 11.22 
25 67569 64884 7.38 
26 64555 58527 17.18 
27 60430 57106 9.70 
28 50378 49997 1.20 
29 50175 51220 -3.28 
30 48271 49089 -2.62 
31 42759 42361 1.36 
32 53628 50100 10.95 
33 42734 42949 -0.73 
34 46418 44567 6.14 
35 51159 47374 12.06 
36 41091 37720 12.01 
37 45209 46517 -4.32 
38 43291 41026 7.80 
39 39149 40027 -3.12 
40 36733 33959 10.43 
41 33701 31924 6.94 
42 33457 33174 1.10 
43 35269 35536 -1.00 
44 32423 32049 1.47 
45 29096 30832 -7.09 
46 29609 33998 -17.40 
47 26487 27952 -6.28 
48 25263 27273 -8.77 
49 22910 23985 -4.96 
50 20586 23218 -12.58  
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Table 2b. All Categories Combined, Low Inflation, Price Changes in Percents 
 
Price Change in % Positive Negative Z-Value 
1 1654535 1292877 210.66 
2 987127 792036 146.26 
3 714404 610636 90.15 
4 572131 494293 75.37 
5 404874 363633 47.04 
6 330664 314028 20.72 
7 278831 273952 6.56 
8 256257 242442 19.56 
9 206590 214455 -12.12 
10 186363 196416 -16.25 
11 168146 176572 -14.35 
12 151629 179133 -47.82 
13 147464 154627 -13.03 
14 129467 152450 -43.29 
15 115764 141946 -51.57 
16 122650 130178 -14.97 
17 116947 133105 -32.31 
18 103816 123467 -41.22 
19 90744 108787 -40.39 
20 98804 104223 -12.03 
21 81917 101902 -46.61 
22 88062 77087 27.01 
23 72590 79946 -18.83 
24 68782 73531 -12.59 
25 64974 60265 13.31 
26 66998 58793 23.13 
27 58916 56068 8.40 
28 50181 61586 -34.11 
29 49239 55522 -19.41 
30 42851 44625 -6.00 
31 38489 42770 -15.02 
32 37532 34864 9.92 
33 29729 33741 -15.92 
34 33954 31617 9.13 
35 31013 26232 19.98 
36 28902 27289 6.80 
37 29610 19209 47.07 
38 27315 22345 22.30 
39 26582 18427 38.44 
40 21786 21579 0.99 
41 30072 20970 40.29 
42 21894 17748 20.82 
43 22440 16368 30.82 
44 19791 17235 13.28 
45 21168 19614 7.70 
46 16818 16723 0.52 
47 13292 15199 -11.30 
48 13875 16580 -15.50 
49 14877 14002 5.15 
50 13145 14266 -6.77 
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Table 3a. All Categories Combined, Deflation, Price Changes in Cents 
 
Price Change in Cents Positive Negative Z-Value 
1 1072926 797687 201.24 
2 614350 482632 125.76 
3 463687 368254 104.63 
4 359824 292415 83.47 
5 307434 244947 84.08 
6 256657 215861 59.35 
7 221610 188616 51.51 
8 187334 167618 33.09 
9 149559 127189 42.52 
10 129117 115699 27.12 
11 112853 103478 20.16 
12 106162 100130 13.28 
13 103670 95437 18.45 
14 89093 84736 10.45 
15 84646 78955 14.07 
16 72653 72355 0.78 
17 73377 64770 23.16 
18 65118 61508 10.14 
19 66383 65638 2.05 
20 57643 57811 -0.49 
21 56121 52181 11.97 
22 49908 50648 -2.33 
23 45871 49709 -12.41 
24 43987 42410 5.37 
25 46329 43533 9.33 
26 44724 41961 9.38 
27 39843 41019 -4.14 
28 35051 34816 0.89 
29 34420 33976 1.70 
30 34884 33819 4.06 
31 28460 29459 -4.15 
32 36880 35455 5.30 
33 29696 30226 -2.17 
34 32330 29349 12.00 
35 35189 32447 10.54 
36 27945 24826 13.58 
37 31099 31584 -1.94 
38 28197 25999 9.44 
39 26146 26556 -1.79 
40 25296 23063 10.15 
41 22027 22258 -1.10 
42 21223 21430 -1.00 
43 24978 25848 -3.86 
44 20919 20625 1.44 
45 19661 19357 1.54 
46 21522 23253 -8.18 
47 17895 18064 -0.89 
48 18622 18908 -1.48 
49 16249 17575 -7.21 
50 14401 15968 -8.99 
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Table 3b. All Categories Combined, Deflation, Price Changes in Percents 
 
Price Change in % Positive Negative Z-Value 
1 1141220 898901 169.65 
2 681315 540571 127.33 
3 496515 418860 81.17 
4 382480 340023 49.95 
5 283179 250915 44.15 
6 225844 213743 18.25 
7 190062 188157 3.10 
8 172890 166784 10.48 
9 138369 147775 -17.58 
10 125667 133492 -15.37 
11 117385 122344 -10.13 
12 104715 128934 -50.10 
13 103438 109879 -13.95 
14 91527 106677 -34.03 
15 77789 95260 -42.00 
16 85445 92440 -16.59 
17 78764 94632 -38.11 
18 68349 84438 -41.16 
19 61441 74405 -35.17 
20 71493 73817 -6.10 
21 53955 71276 -48.95 
22 58647 54368 12.73 
23 48101 54147 -18.91 
24 46712 50332 -11.62 
25 46113 41600 15.24 
26 48012 41220 22.74 
27 39136 38728 1.46 
28 35798 43910 -28.73 
29 33218 37130 -14.75 
30 29206 30894 -6.89 
31 25421 29572 -17.70 
32 26895 25625 5.54 
33 21690 23114 -6.73 
34 25150 21731 15.79 
35 21084 18316 13.94 
36 20576 20044 2.64 
37 21365 12417 48.68 
38 19234 15076 22.45 
39 18150 12685 31.12 
40 15093 14572 3.02 
41 20177 13296 37.61 
42 16177 10801 32.73 
43 14710 11249 21.48 
44 13787 11451 14.70 
45 14500 11752 16.96 
46 12246 10721 10.06 
47 9181 9836 -4.75 
48 9559 9216 2.50 
49 10395 9177 8.71 
50 8778 9945 -8.53 
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Table 4. What Might Constitute a “Small” Price Change 
Statistical Analysis of the Data by Product Category in Absolute (Cents) and Relative (%) Terms 
 Entire Sample Period Low/Zero Inflation Period Deflation Period 
 Absolut
e 
(Cents) 
Relativ
e (%) 
Absolute 
(Cents) 
Relative 
(%) 
Absolut
e 
(Cents) 
Relative 
(%) 
Analgesics 30 8 21 10 3 7 
Bath Soap 10 2 2 1 2 1 
Bathroom Tissues 11 4 9 1 10 1 
Beer  3 0 0 2 0 2 
Bottled Juices 13 5 21 11 9 5 
Canned Soup  13 8 9 7 6 8 
Canned Tuna  3 2 3 1 4 2 
Cereals 33 9 19 9 19 9 
Cheeses  18 6 9 3 5 3 
Cigarettes  14 8 1 8 1 3 
Cookies  11 6 11 6 11 8 
Crackers  15 6 15 5 15 8 
Dish Detergent  4 2 4 1 4 1 
Fabric Softeners  5 2 8 3 2 3 
Front-end-candies  7 9 6 8 6 5 
Frozen Dinners  6 1 3 1 3 1 
Frozen Entrees  30 5 17 8 8 6 
Frozen Juices  9 5 7 6 9 7 
Grooming Products  12 8 15 8 13 8 
Laundry Detergents  8 2 8 2 6 2 
Oatmeal 7 7 2 1 2 1 
Paper Towels  1 2 3 4 10 4 
Refrigerated Juices 10 6 8 4 4 2 
Shampoos 13 7 10 6 13 7 
Snack Crackers  7 5 7 5 7 3 
Soaps 7 4 9 4 5 3 
Soft Drinks  23 9 14 11 14 8 
Tooth Brushes  9 8 9 7 11 7 
Tooth Pastes 16 5 10 4 10 4 
Total (All 29 Categories 
Combined) 
36 8 19 8 15 8 
Notes:  
1. The figures reported in the table are the cutoff points of what might constitute a “small” price change for 
each category. For each category, the cutoff point is the first point at which the asymmetry is not supported 
statistically. Thus, for example, in the Analgesics category, when the entire sample is used and we consider 
the price changes in cents, we see that for price changes of up to 30 cents, there is asymmetry as our theory 
predicts. Beyond that point the asymmetry disappears. 
2. In all tables, the critical values for 1%, 5% and 10% significance are 2.575, 1.96, and 1.645, respectively. 
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Figure 1: Frequency of Positive and Negative Wholesale Price Changes: All 29 Categories, Entire Period 
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Figure 2: Frequency of Positive and Negative Wholesale Price Changes: All 29 Categories, Low Inflation Period 
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Figure 3: Frequency of Positive and Negative Wholesale Price Changes: All 29 Categories, Deflation Period 
 
Figure 4. Monthly Inflation Rate Based on Producer Price Index, September 1989-May 1997 
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(a) Cents – Entire Period (b) Percents – Entire Period 
(c) Cents – Low/Zero Inflation Period 
 
(d) Percents – Low/Zero Inflation Period 
 
(e) Cents – Deflation Period 
 
(f) Percents – Deflation Period 
Figure 5: Frequency of Positive and Negative Wholesale Price Changes: Toothpaste 
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 TECHNICAL APPENDIX – Data 
This appendix addresses the concern regarding our wholesale data: Could the Results be an 
Artifact of How the Wholesale Prices Are Calculated? 
Our wholesale price, as reported in the Dominick’s database, is based on the average 
acquisition cost (AAC). The AAC per unit is calculated as follows: 
{ } { }
)(
)1()()1()()()(
ttoryTotalInven
tAACtsalestryEndInventotpricetPurchtAAC −×−−+×=  
where,  
Purch(t) = Inventory bought in t;  
price(t) = Per unit wholesale price paid in t;  
EndInventory(t-1) = Inventory at end of t-1;  
Sales(t) = Retail sales at t;  
TotalInventory(t) = Total Inventory at t 
Lagged adjustment of AAC 
Can it be claimed that our results could be just an artifact of the manner in which AAC is 
calculated? Manufacturers often inform the retailer in advance of an impending temporary price 
reduction, permitting the retailer to completely deplete its inventory and then “forward-buying” 
to overstock at the lower price (Peltzman, 2000). Since new purchases form a large proportion of 
the total inventory in this case, the large discount shows up as a commensurately large reduction 
in AAC. On the other hand, a retailer buys less when the wholesale price goes up. Consequently, 
a wholesale price increase of the same large magnitude as the decrease considered earlier, will 
translate into a relatively smaller increase in AAC (the so called, lagged adjustment). It is 
reasonable to expect that the observed asymmetry in wholesale prices therefore may be driven by 
such forward buying phenomenon. 
In the absence of actual wholesale prices, how do we conduct a direct test to check for the 
above effect? One way of proceeding is to check the data for patterns implied by the above 
rationale. We discuss the following analyses in the same spirit. 
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 National Brands versus Private Labels 
Note that the forward buying rationale suggests that if the manner of calculating AAC was 
the major driver of our results (asymmetry in the small), it should be more pronounced for 
products that are subjected to greater degree of forward buying. For products not subject to 
major fluctuations in its purchases driven by promotional prices, we should expect much lesser 
degree of such systematic distortion. This leads to the following null proposition which holds 
true if the manner of computing AAC was the major driver of our results.1 
Forward Buying Proposition: Products subject to greater degree of forward 
buying will exhibit greater asymmetry than products that are subject to 
lesser degree of forward buying. 
Unfortunately, we do not have direct data on the degree of forward buying. However, 
according to Hoch et al. (1995), private labels are not promoted as heavily, and hence are 
forward-bought less than national brands. Therefore, a comparison of national brands to private 
labels provides a natural context to test the above proposition. In essence, if forward buying is 
the main driver of our results, the predicted asymmetry should be stronger for national brands 
than for private labels. We therefore undertook two additional analyses to explore whether, and 
to what extent, can our results be attributed to the method of computing AAC. In the paragraphs 
below we first discuss the data and then the individual tests. 
National Brand versus Private Label Data 
For the purposes of the test we need data on comparable national brand (NB)-private label 
(PL) product pairs. We base our identification of such NB-PL pairs on a recently published study 
of Barsky, et al (2003), who use the same Dominick’s data to investigate the size of markups for 
nationally branded products sold in the U.S. retail grocery industry. Their measure of markup is 
based on a comparison of the prices of matched pairs of NB-PL products. To implement their 
strategy, therefore, Barsky, et al. (2003) had to identify the product pairs based on several 
comparability criteria, which included, among other attributes, product’s quality, size, packaging, 
etc. For quality comparison, they used Hoch and Banerji’s (1993) PL product quality rankings.  
                                                 
1 This is not to be confused with our theoretical proposition earlier. Here we intend to check if the “null,” (forward 
buying is a key driver of the observed asymmetry), can be rejected in favor of the “alternate” (that it is not). 
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 After filtering out the product pairs that were not comparable for various reasons (for 
example, size differences, quality differences, insufficient number of observations, etc.), Barsky, 
et al. (2003) were left with 231 matched NB-PL product pairs of comparable size and quality, 
covering 19 product categories.2 These categories are Analgesics, Bottled Juices, Cereals, 
Cheeses, Cookies, Crackers, Canned Soups, Dish Detergent, Frozen Entrees, Frozen Juices, 
Fabric Softeners, Grooming Products, Laundry Detergent, Oatmeal, Snack Crackers, Tooth 
Pastes, Toothbrushes, Soft Drinks, and Canned Tuna. However, Barsky, et al. (2003) argue that 
Toothbrushes category is an outlier for its unusually high markup ratio, in comparison to the 
remaining 18 categories. Consequently, they omit the Toothbrushes category from much of their 
analysis.3 Following their strategy, therefore, we also exclude the category of Toothbrushes from 
our analysis and were left with 18 categories with matched NB-PL pairs for our analyses. 
Analysis 1: Comparison of aggregate asymmetries between NB and PL 
We start by conducting an analysis identical to that used in the main paper and compare 
the aggregate asymmetry thresholds between NB and PL pairs for all the 18 categories. The 
hypothesis below is derived directly from the null proposition.4 
Hypothesis 1: Aggregate asymmetry threshold for National Brands is greater than 
that for Private Labels. 
Tables R2.1 and R2.2 below report the results of the analysis in terms of absolute changes 
(Cents) and relative changes (%), respectively. The thresholds we obtain are marked in bold. In 
the absolute case we obtain an asymmetry threshold of 6 cents for the national brands (NB) and 5 
cents for private labels (PL). In the relative case, we obtain identical thresholds of 4%.  
Two important observations are in order here. First, note the similarity of the magnitudes 
of the thresholds in both the tests. So, while we cannot subject Hypothesis 1 to a statistical test of 
significance and are limited to comparing two numbers, the prima facie evidence argues against 
the hypothesis.  
                                                 
2 See Barsky, et al. (2003), Tables 7A.1-7A.19 for a detailed list of the NB-PL product pairs. 
3 See Barsky, et al., 2003, p. 194. 
4 This and all subsequent hypotheses derived from the null proposition are in the nature of null hypotheses which we 
aim to reject in favor of the alternate proposition that forward buying is not a key driver. 
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 Second, note the presence of significant asymmetry for the PL sample. This last point is 
important because if forward buying indeed were a primary driver of our observed asymmetry 
and if PLs are not subjected to significant forward buying, we should expect only insignificant 
asymmetry for the PL sample. But that is not the case and the asymmetry for PLs is not only 
significant but comparable to that of NBs.  
Table R2.1: Frequencies of price changes for the 18 categories with NB-PL pairs (Cents) 
NB PL Price Change 
in Cents Positive Negative Z-Value Positive Negative Z-Value 
1 4496 3550 10.546 4788 3348 15.965
2 2117 1683 7.040 2473 1833 9.753
3 1398 1097 6.026 1482 1369 2.116
4 1048 860 4.304 1121 912 4.635
5 823 727 2.438 895 736 3.937
6 661 517 4.196 682 644 1.044
7 542 493 1.523 551 472 2.470
8 489 429 1.980 361 397 1.308
9 415 330 3.114 365 332 1.250
10 382 306 2.897 324 272 2.130
11 270 295 1.052 364 255 4.381
       
 
Table R2.2: Frequencies of price changes for the 18 categories with NB-PL pairs (%) 
NB PL Price Change 
in % Positive Negative Z-Value Positive Negative Z-Value 
1 4072 3304 8.942 4480 3220 14.359
2 1893 1512 6.529 2156 1613 8.845
3 1300 1056 5.027 1431 1138 5.781
4 905 795 2.668 1061 887 3.942
5 648 592 1.590 758 746 0.309
6 566 526 1.210 634 612 0.623
7 428 432 0.136 497 536 1.213
8 416 394 0.773 415 467 1.751
9 311 369 2.224 392 415 0.810
10 321 292 1.171 459 362 3.385
11 257 226 1.411 340 336 0.154
       
 
Taken together, these observations provide strong evidence that our results are not entirely 
driven by the manner of computing AAC. In the subsequent analyses, we conduct further tests to 
explore the robustness of this statement. 
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 Let the degree of asymmetry in a given price change be the difference between the number 
of positive and negative changes expressed as a percentage of the number of positive changes. 
For example, the degree of asymmetry for 1 Cent difference is calculated as: (#POS 1 Cent 
changes - #NEG 1Cent changes)/#POS 1 Cent changes. Like earlier, if forward buying is indeed 
the primary driver of the asymmetry in AAC, we should expect that it would reflect in a greater 
mean degree of asymmetry for NB compared to PL. This leads to the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: Aggregate degree of asymmetry for National Brands is greater than 
that for Private Labels. 
The difference between hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2 is that while the first considered 
asymmetry thresholds, the second considers the extent of asymmetry between positive and 
negative changes. 
To conduct this test, we first calculated the degree of asymmetry for each price change and 
then compared the mean asymmetry between NB and PL with a paired t-test. We conducted the 
test for both absolute (Cents) and relative (%) changes. Given the thresholds of 6 cents for NB 
and 5 cents for PL in absolute terms, and 4% for both in relative terms, we restricted the 
comparison to small magnitudes (1-11 Cents and 1-11%) in order to focus on the region of 
interest.5 Table R2.3a below reports the mean degrees of asymmetry we observe and the results 
of the paired t-tests. In the absolute case, we observe an average degree of asymmetry of 15.2% 
for NB and 15.0% for PL. For the relative case, the averages are 8.4% and 8.3% for NB and PL 
respectively. Notice that none of the comparisons are significant (p = 0.485 and 0.493 
respectively), i.e. we find no support for hypothesis 2.  
In order to make sure that we did not ignore any possible regions where such asymmetry 
might exist, we repeated the analysis successively for 1-5 Cents, 1-6 Cents, 1-7 Cents, 1-8 Cents, 
1-9 Cents and 1-10 Cents as well as for 1-5%, 1-6%, 1-7%, 1-8%, 1-9% and 1-10% bands. In 
none of these 12 additional comparisons was there any significant difference in the average 
degree of asymmetry between NB and PL (all p’s > 0.30). 
                                                 
5 This also has the added advantage of being a strong test because any difference between NB and PL due to forward 
buying is more likely to manifest in the small. We also checked even smaller ranges.  
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 Table R2.3a: Comparison of average degree of asymmetry between NB and PL 
 Absolute (Cents) Relative (%) 
 NB PL NB PL 
Mean Degree 
of Asymmetry 15.2% 15.0% 8.4% 8.3% 
t-stat 0.039  0.019  
p value 0.485  0.493  
     
 
In addition to the tests above, we checked the degree of asymmetry of the PL sample. As 
argued earlier, if forward buying indeed were a primary driver of our observed asymmetry and if 
PLs are not subjected to significant forward buying, we should not expect any significant 
asymmetry for the PL sample. To test this we checked if the mean degrees of asymmetry of the 
PL sample were significantly greater than zero. The results are in Table R2.3b below. For both 
(absolute and elative) cases, the means are significantly greater than zero (p<0.05). 
Table R2.3b: Mean degree of asymmetry of PL sample 
 (Absolute - Cents) (Relative - %) 
Mean 0.149965 0.083003 
t-stat 4.213 1.913 
Sig. p<0.05 p<0.05 
(H0: m=0)  
 
Therefore, in keeping with the conclusions following Hypothesis 1, the results of the above 
analyses provide strong evidence that our results cannot be entirely driven by the manner of 
computing AAC. We now drill down further into the data and look at even more disaggregate 
comparisons.6 
Analysis 2: Comparison of category level asymmetries between NB and PL 
For this investigation, we conducted an analysis identical to that used in the main paper, 
and compared the asymmetry thresholds between NB and PL for individual categories. The 
hypothesis below is derived directly from the proposition. 
Hypothesis 3: The average category level asymmetry threshold for National 
Brands is greater than that for Private Labels. 
                                                 
6 Note however, that our sample size becomes very small as we drill down to more disaggregate levels. 
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 To test this hypothesis, we first obtained the asymmetry thresholds for both NB and PL in 
individual categories and then compared the average threshold with a paired t-test. The analysis 
is conducted for both absolute (Cents) as well as relative (%) changes. Table R2.4a below reports 
the mean asymmetry thresholds we observe and the results of the paired t-tests. In the absolute 
case, we observe an average degree of asymmetry of 1.111 for NB and 1.389 for PL. For the 
relative case, the averages are 0.944% and 1.556% for NB and PL respectively. Notice that none 
of the comparisons are significant (p = 0.280 and 0.091 respectively), i.e. we find no support for 
hypothesis 3. 
Table R2.4a: Comparison of average category level asymmetry thresholds between NB and PL 
 Absolute (Cents) Relative (%) 
 NB PL NB PL 
Mean Threshold 
of Asymmetry 1.111 1.389 0.944% 1.556% 
t-stat -0.589  -1.364  
p value 0.280  0.091  
     
 
In addition, we also checked the average category level asymmetry thresholds for the PL 
sample. In keeping with the arguments made earlier, we should not expect significant asymmetry 
in this sample if forward buying was the primary driver of our observed asymmetry. We test if 
the average category level asymmetry thresholds for the PL sample are significantly greater than 
zero. The results are in table R2.4b. In both (absolute and relative) cases, the average thresholds 
are significantly greater than zero (p<0.05) 
Table R2.4b: Average category level asymmetry threshold for PL sample 
 (Absolute - Cents) (Relative - %) 
Mean 1.389 1.556 
T 4.034 4.932 
Sig. p<0.05 p<0.05 
(H0: m=0)  
 
Again, in keeping with the conclusions following Hypotheses 1 and 2, the results of the 
above analyses provide additional evidence that our results cannot be entirely driven by the 
manner of computing AAC.  
Wholesale Price Asymmetry (Ray, Chen, Bergen, Levy)
8 of 39 Technical Appendix
 Nevertheless, in search of further robustness, we continue the investigation in greater detail 
by comparing individual category level thresholds in the following analysis. In conducting this 
analysis however, we feel compelled to point out the drastic loss of sample size that occurs. For 
example, the average number of observations per category in the data set, is 3,431,118, while the 
average number of observations for each NB-PL pair for a category is only 3,710, a reduction in 
excess of 99%. Therefore, the comparisons should be kept in perspective – they are likely to be 
more illustrative in nature and perhaps more accurate in a relative sense than in an absolute 
sense. 
Table R2.5 below reports the asymmetry thresholds we obtain for each NB-PL pair. The 
analysis is repeated for both absolute (cents) and relative (%) changes. We also report the sample 
size for each pair in the last column. 
The results reported in this table provide additional support to our claims following 
Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3, that our results cannot be entirely driven by the manner of computing 
AAC. This is based on the following three observations. 
Observation 1: Out of the 18 product categories for which we have data, 3 didn’t show 
asymmetry for either absolute or relative changes; 12 showed the asymmetry for either absolute 
or relative changes and showed an asymmetry threshold for private labels that is as large as or 
larger than national brands; 3 showed the asymmetry for either absolute or relative change and 
showed a larger asymmetry threshold for national brands than for private labels. Therefore, the 
proportion of product categories for which the prediction of forward buying is supported is less 
than chance level (i.e., 3/15 < 50%; z = 2.32; p < 0.03). 
Observation 2: Out of 36 (= 18 x 2) possible comparisons, there are five that are consistent 
with the prediction of forward buying (marked in bold in the table). However, 15 are in the 
opposite direction and in the remaining 16 cases the threshold is the same for private labels and 
national brands.7 Altogether, the majority of comparisons (i.e., 31, or more than 86%) are 
inconsistent with the prediction of forward buying. 
                                                 
7 8 of which have an asymmetry threshold of 0 for both NB and PL – an observation that we feel is driven by the 
severely limited sample size. 
Wholesale Price Asymmetry (Ray, Chen, Bergen, Levy)
9 of 39 Technical Appendix
 Observation 3: For comparisons where there is a non-zero threshold for either NB or PL, 
there are 15 for which the threshold is larger for PL than for NB, compared to 5 for which the 
opposite is true. The difference is statistically significant (z = 2.27, p < .03). 
Table R2.5: Asymmetry thresholds for the 18 categories with NB-PL pairs 
Categories Absolute (Cents) Relative (%)  
 NB PL NB PL Sample Size 
Analgesics 1 1 3 3 5149 
Bottled Juices 3 3 1 2 6735 
Canned Soup  3 3 4 2 6136 
Canned Tuna  0 0 0 0 919 
Cereals 3 3 3 4 6111 
Cheeses  1 1 0 1 3021 
Cookies  2 2 0 1 3513 
Crackers  1 0 1 0 2410 
Dish Detergent  0 2 0 1 2756 
Fabric Softeners  0 0 0 0 2060 
Frozen Entrees  0 5 0 3 636 
Frozen Juices  2 2 1 3 6587 
Grooming Products  0 0 0 0 667 
Laundry Detergents  0 2 0 1 3930 
Oatmeal 0 0 1 3 920 
Snack Crackers  0 0 0 1 1017 
Soft Drinks  0 1 0 3 10623 
Tooth Pastes 4 0 3 0 3593 
Total (all 18 categories 
combined) 
6 5 4 4 66783 
Bold: NB > PL      
 
To conclude, we do not find any strong reason to believe that the forward buying 
hypothesis related to AAC is a primary driver of our results. We subject the data to a series of 
tests to check if there are patterns consistent with the forward buying hypotheses. None of the 
analyses, whether descriptive or statistical, provide support for these hypotheses. In the absence 
of such evidence, we conclude that it is highly unlikely that our empirical results are an artifact 
of the manner in which the wholesale prices have been calculated.  
Such a conclusion must however, be tempered with the knowledge that we are after all 
dealing with a derived measure of wholesale prices and a better test of our theory would be with 
actual wholesale prices. Unfortunately, such data is not available. We are not unique in dealing 
with this problem. A number of other authors who have dealt with it bemoan the lack of proper 
wholesale price data (cf. Cecchetti, 1986; Peltzman, 2000; Chintagunta, 2002; Levy, et al. 2002; 
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 Chevalier, et al. 2003 etc.). Creative approaches like estimating wholesale prices from regression 
which is particularly common in the empirical industrial organization literature (see Carlton and 
Perloff, 1994), using aggregate price indexes, such as wholesale price index, as a proxy 
(Cecchetti, 1985), rough accounting estimates (Nevo, 2001), even simulation (Tellis and 
Zufryden, 1995) are the norm in such cases. Others may ignore explicit consideration of 
wholesale prices altogether (Gerstner et al., 1994; Pesendorfer, 2001).  
While the lack of accurate wholesale price data is unfortunate, we believe that should not 
hinder theory building in the domain of wholesale prices. Nevertheless, the onus is on the 
researcher to ensure that any empirical test of theory using weak wholesale data is actually 
robust to the weakness of the data. It is in that spirit that we conducted these additional checks. 
To keep things in perspective therefore, it is necessary to understand that while we stand 
behind the spirit of our results, we recognize that the verity of the exact magnitudes of the 
asymmetry we report is subject to some uncertainty.  
Reverse Asymmetry in the large 
It may be worthwhile here, to consider the role of reverse asymmetry in the large vis-à-vis 
the forward buying proposition. When a manufacturer offers a temporary off-invoice discount to 
a retailer, the retailer tends to buy more of the product than it needs during the period of the sale. 
AAC typically falls by a large amount then. Theoretically, if this drop in AAC is not matched by 
a similar increase when prices do go up, one should see reverse asymmetry in the large. Since 
retailers are normally expected to purchase lesser amounts at higher prices, this leads us to 
believe that reverse asymmetry in the large – i.e. more large price decreases than increases, is a 
reasonable prediction if the rival forward buying hypothesis was a primary driver of our results. 
The method we employed to test this is to compare, for each of the 29 product categories, 
the frequencies in which positive price changes exceeded negative price changes (“positive” 
asymmetry), with the frequencies in which the opposite holds true (“negative” asymmetry). If the 
alternative, lagged adjustment is the main driver, then we should observe relatively more 
frequent occurrences of negative than positive asymmetry in the large. If there is no such 
negative asymmetry in the large, as our theory predicts, then occurrences of the number of 
positive and negative asymmetries should be statistically equal. We report the number of 
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 occurrences of positive (p) and negative asymmetries (n) as a ratio (p:n) in Table R2.68 We 
carried out the analyses for the entire sample, as well as for a sample of low/zero inflation period 
and a sample of deflation period. We also did the analyses both in terms of absolute changes in 
cents and in terms of percentage changes.  
Table R2.6: Number of Positive vs. Negative Asymmetry Beyond Threshold 
 Entire Sample Period Low/Zero Inflation Period Deflation Period 
 Absolute 
(Cents) 
Relative 
(%) 
Absolute 
(Cents) 
Relative 
(%) 
Absolute 
(Cents) 
Relative 
(%) 
Analgesics 16:1 17:20 21:3 13:18 28:8 14:18 
Bath Soap 11:11 26:15 13:15 24:18 12:13 21:14 
Bathroom Tissues 10:15 26:12 11:18 32:10 13:15 33:10 
Beer  2:43** 29:14 3:34** 29:13 15:21 27:12 
Bottled Juices 15:11 26:16 9:10 24:12 20:16 25:14 
Canned Soup  19:11 21:13 17:13 17:13 21:16 19:16 
Canned Tuna  22:10 24:13 14:17 19:19 16:14 17:15 
Cereals 10:1 5:27 22:2 17:19 16:8 16:21 
Cheeses  14:11 25:14 13:16 22:21 20:11 21:17 
Cigarettes  23:8 20:15 22:22 14:20 9:33** 18:19 
Cookies  15:19 23:17 16:16 21:19 15:19 17:19 
Crackers  12:13 22:18 17:15 20:19 18:15 19:18 
Dish Detergent  16:16 23:16 8:24** 23:17 9:28** 26:16 
Fabric Softeners  13:21 23:19 13:20 22:13 10:19** 21:15 
Front-end-candies  21:15 11:25** 14:24 8:31** 18:18 6:34** 
Frozen Dinners  21:17 22:20 29:11 22:21 24:13 19:22 
Frozen Entrees  7:8 18:24 10:15 13:26** 19:17 17:24 
Frozen Juices  8:21** 23:15 13:21 24:11 17:17 19:8 
Grooming Products  18:11 26:13 12:12 26:14 19:12 26:11 
Laundry Detergents  13:12 21:23 8:21** 19:23 14:11 17:20 
Oatmeal 36:2 17:20 41:3 21:21 26:8 19:21 
Paper Towels  19:12 26:8 16:15 22:16 9:16 23:12 
Refrigerated Juices 20:7 26:16 18:15 25:17 19:14 22:17 
Shampoos 11:13 27:16 24:11 23:18 20:13 22:18 
Snack Crackers  25:11 29:12 15:21 22:20 17:20 25:19 
Soaps 7:10 29:10 19:4 32:7 22:4 33:8 
Soft Drinks  19:7 13:25** 20:11 14:24 15:17 16:24 
Tooth Brushes  17:15 23:15 13:16 21:18 16:17 20:20 
Tooth Pastes 12:11 23:17 12:21 26:15 13:20 27:12 
Total (All 29 Categories 
Combined) 
7:4 20:20 12:12 17:23 15:11 19:22 
** There are more frequent occurrences of negative asymmetry than positive asymmetry (p < .05). 
The results in Table R2.6 do not support the alternative explanation that lagged adjustment 
is driving our result. Specifically, with any of the six tests we did, there were three or fewer 
                                                 
8 For example, the ratio 13:12 for Laundry Detergents suggests that there were 13 occurrences of positive to 12 
occurrences of negative asymmetries. 
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 product categories in which there were more negative than positive asymmetry in the large, in a 
statistically significant sense (z>1.65, p<0.05). Similarly, when all the 29 product categories 
were combined, there was statistically equal number of positive and negative asymmetry in the 
large.  
However, we acknowledge that it is not clear whether this by itself is a strong test. Reverse 
asymmetry in the large appears to be highly contextual and dependent on several factors. After 
procuring a large amount of the product at a low cost, the retailer normally quits buying for 
several periods while going through its inventory. How AAC adjusts subsequently, is a function 
of a number of things including the remaining inventory, quantity purchased, and wholesale 
prices when the retailer starts buying again. The hypothesized reverse asymmetry will hold if the 
retailer starts buying small quantities before the forward bought inventory is largely depleted. 
However, if the retailer waits till the entire inventory is depleted before restocking its entire 
inventory at a higher price, then we may not see the reverse asymmetry in the large.9  
In our analysis it is difficult to control for these different inventory practices. Nevertheless, 
for situations where the reverse asymmetry is not predicted, i.e. where the retailer restocks at a 
higher price only after depleting its forward bought inventory, it is not clear that asymmetry in 
the small will be driven by forward buying. It is possible that for such products forward buying is 
no longer a rival explanation for our finding of asymmetric pricing in the small. For the other 
inventory practices (re-ordering in small quantities before depletion of the forward bought 
inventory) on the other hand, it appears theoretically reasonable to predict reverse asymmetry in 
the large simultaneously with asymmetry in the small.  
We understand either can be true, and maybe it’s a combination of both practices. 
Nevertheless, even if it is a combination of both practices, reverse asymmetry in the large may be 
a reasonable check. Either the inventory pattern occurs often enough to be a rival explanation for 
our asymmetric pricing patterns (in which case one should expect reverse asymmetry to be 
prevalent) or it does not happen often enough to generate reverse asymmetry (in which case 
asymmetric pricing should not be prevalent, so the rival explanation of forward buying is not a 
                                                 
9 We assume that the entire inventory is replenished in this case and that the prices go back up at the point of 
repurchase. For certain cases, prices may not go back up to previous levels. For such smaller increases, the 
prediction of reverse asymmetry holds along with that of asymmetry in the small. 
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 problem for our theory). So, we believe, albeit not perfect, the lack of reverse asymmetric pricing 
in the large is not a wholly unreasonable metric of the validity of our results.  
We do not find any evidence of such reverse asymmetry in our data. In combination with 
the results comparing national brands and private labels, we would like to believe this is further 
corroborating evidence that our empirical results (asymmetry in the small) are not driven by 
forward buying. 
Changes in Manufacturer’s Pricing Policies from September 1994 
The last check on the measure of wholesale price data concerns a change in the 
manufacturers’ pricing policies during the sample period. Starting September 1994, 
manufacturers in the Dominick’s dataset adopted retrospective discounts, whereby they offered 
rebates based on sales in a specified period rather than offering a direct discount. It is not clear 
how this change might affect the AAC. Earlier studies using the same dataset therefore often 
restrict their sample up to September 1994 (e.g. Peltzman, 2000; page 472). To rule out that our 
results may be driven by this change, we conduct an additional analysis by restricting the sample 
to the period September 1989 to August 1994. We find that our central result – that of 
asymmetry in the small and symmetry in the large consistently holds in this restricted sample. 
Table R2.7 reports the absolute (cents) and relative (%) thresholds obtained for the pre-
September 1004 sample, while Table R2.8 reports the number of instances of positive and 
negative asymmetries observed beyond the thresholds for the same sample. There are statistically 
equal numbers of positive and negative asymmetries when the entire sample is considered 
(p>0.05). In a category level analysis, in 40 out of 58 (i.e., 69%) instances, there are statistically 
equal numbers of positive and negative asymmetries. More positive than negative asymmetry is 
observed only in 8 instances out of 58 possible comparisons (13.8%). It happened for 3 product 
categories in terms of absolute changes, and 5 product categories in terms of relative changes. 
More negative than positive asymmetry happened in only 10 instances out of 58 possible 
comparisons (17.2%). It happened for 6 product categories in terms of absolute changes, and 4 
product categories in terms of relative changes. Overall therefore, our central results (asymmetry 
in the small but symmetry in the large remains unchanged for the pre-September 1994 sample, 
thereby ruling out the pricing policy change as a driver of our results. 
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 Table R2.7. What Might Constitute a “Small” Price Change? 
Statistical Analysis of the Data by Product Category in Absolute (¢) and Relative (%) Terms 
Subsample: Sept. 1989 - - August 1994 
Categories Absolute (Cents) Relative (%) 
Analgesics 26 25 
Bath Soap 5 5 
Bathroom Tissues 5 2 
Beer  12 6 
Bottled Juices 14 9 
Canned Soup  14 13 
Canned Tuna  3 3 
Cereals 23 10 
Cheeses  12 14 
Cigarettes  1 1 
Cookies  4 9 
Crackers  3 2 
Dish Detergent  7 3 
Fabric Softeners  8 4 
Front-end-candies  6 7 
Frozen Dinners  7 3 
Frozen Entrees  1 1 
Frozen Juices  0 0 
Grooming Products  14 9 
Laundry Detergents  14 4 
Oatmeal 10 7 
Paper Towels  1 1 
Refrigerated Juices 10 3 
Shampoos 10 3 
Snack Crackers  3 2 
Soaps 9 11 
Soft Drinks  2 3 
Tooth Brushes  15 1 
Tooth Pastes 10 6 
Total (all 29 product 
categories combined) 
20 10 
Below the thresholds of number of positive changes are significantly more than number of negative 
changes (p<0.05). 
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 Table R2.7. Number of Positive vs. Negative Asymmetry Beyond Threshold 
Subsample: Sept. 1989 - - August 1994 
 Absolute (Cents) Relative (%) 
 Positive 
asymmetry 
Negative 
asymmetry 
Positive 
asymmetry 
Negative 
asymmetry 
Analgesics 16 13 9 11 
Bath Soap 12 16 20 13 
Bathroom Tissues 16 19 12* 27* 
Beer  17 15 19 19 
Bottled Juices 8* 21* 15 14 
Canned Soup  17 9 27** 6** 
Canned Tuna  17 20 19 12 
Cereals 13** 3** 15 17 
Cheeses  17 9 17** 5** 
Cigarettes  0* 12* 1* 13* 
Cookies  21 14 27** 13** 
Crackers  16 20 26 15 
Dish Detergent  12 17 17 19 
Fabric Softeners  9* 22* 14 22 
Front-end-candies  5* 21* 27** 3** 
Frozen Dinners  15 22 15 16 
Frozen Entrees  27 19 18 24 
Frozen Juices  16 19 26 16 
Grooming Products  7* 20* 8* 24* 
Laundry Detergents  12 15 17 19 
Oatmeal 15 8 11 13 
Paper Towels  17 16 21 15 
Refrigerated Juices 9* 24* 19 12 
Shampoos 13 13 24 14 
Snack Crackers  18 11 25 15 
Soaps 22** 10** 20** 8** 
Soft Drinks  27** 13** 14* 31* 
Tooth Brushes  16 12 22 13 
Tooth Pastes 14 17 20 16 
Total (all 29 product 
categories combined) 
14 11 23 14 
**: More positive than negative asymmetry. 
*: More negative than positive asymmetry. . 
(p < .05). 
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 TECHNICAL APPENDIX – Future Extension of Model 
Speculative comments regarding extending the model to n-periods 
In the paper, we have shown why asymmetric adjustment of wholesale prices is a subgame 
perfect equilibrium in a 2-period model.  It is interesting to posit what the nature of the 
equilibrium will be when we extend the game to longer time horizons.  Such extension can be 
done in several ways.   
One way of extending the game would be to consider additional time periods.  For 
simplicity, we can begin with assuming no additional change in upstream costs beyond those 
existing in the current model.  If for example, the manufacturer was to set price for n-1 future 
periods instead of just one.  Since now the retailer would face a cost x in each future period, it 
may allow the manufacturer to incorporate the cumulative degree of retailer’s rigidity in the price 
it sets following the initial period.  Knowing this, the retailer would of course set a 
commensurately different initial price.  The magnitude of the wholesale asymmetry |∆w*| derived 
for the 2-period solution will then be modified by at least two factors – (a) the number of time 
periods being considered, n, and (b) the magnitude of discount factor, δ.  Taking the liberty to 
speculate, it stands to reason that the magnitude of the modification will likely be some 
transformation G(|∆w*|; n,δ), where ∑G/∑n›0 and ∑G/∑δ‹0.  Substantively therefore, this is 
unlikely to be different from the results and conclusions we draw from our simpler model.  It 
could be further complicated with additional changes in costs (and related uncertainty), which 
will likely lead to similar results, although it is not clear how these complexities would be likely 
to change the central results of the two period model.  
We can also consider another model emphasizing repeated price setting games, with the 
manufacturer actions being asymmetric or symmetric pricing in each period.  Manufacturer 
payoffs in any given period in such a game could be contingent on its historical pricing behavior.  
This could be achieved in several ways, e.g. by explicitly giving the retailer the choice of 
imposing penalties or even by invoking some sort of reputation mechanisms.  The equilibrium 
outcome is less certain here.  For an infinitely repeated 2-player game, the Folk Theorem would 
predict that “any combination of actions observed in any finite number of repetitions is the 
unique outcome of some subgame perfect equilibrium” as long as the rate of time preference (the 
discount factor) is sufficiently small and the probability that the game ends in any repetition is 
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 sufficiently small (Rasmusen, 2002; page 112).  This would suggest that asymmetric pricing 
cannot be completely ruled out, yet may be only one of many possible outcomes, even when 
manufacturers expect to be in a continued relationship with the retailer.  Nevertheless, these 
extensions are beyond the scope of our model and we can merely speculate as to the likely 
outcomes of such a setup.   
In this context, an observation relevant for our purposes is that there is significant 
uncertainty in the duration of relationships between manufacturers and retailers.  While 
manufacturers and retailers often engage over long time horizons, supermarkets frequently drop 
not only individual SKUs but sometimes also entire categories from their product portfolio.  As 
Peltzman (2000, p. 500) notes, “Occasionally (the) leading items in a category is either 
introduced or replaced (within a given observation period).”  Turnover in brands is also not 
uncommon.  Manufacturers may also change the pricing format (see Peltzman’s paper, page 
500). These suggest that it may be more accurate to model the pricing game as being of a finite 
duration.  In that case, it is reasonable to speculate that our results will hold and asymmetry will 
be an equilibrium outcome.10  Again, these conjectures are beyond the scope of the model we 
currently have in the paper.  However, these are certainly interesting and worthy of future 
research in the area.   
Conjectures aside, in the final analysis, a benefit of making the retailers forward looking in 
the model is that – in equilibrium retailers are not disadvantaged by asymmetric pricing in the 
small – they adjust their initial pricing decisions to reflect this economic reality.  That was 
another reason why this was such a valuable extension of the model.11  So it is not clear that a 
richer space of punishments, relationships or prices would necessarily be of any improvement to 
the retailer in this situation.  The costs of price adjustment are real, and as such any solution 
would have to factor them into the equilibrium.  
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Figure 1.1a. Frequency of Positive and Negative Wholesale Price Changes in Cents by Category
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Figure 1.1b. Frequency of Positive and Negative Wholesale Price Changes in Cents by Category
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Figure 1.1c. Frequency of Positive and Negative Wholesale Price Changes in Cents by Category
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Figure 1.2a. Frequency of Positive and Negative Wholesale Price Changes in Percents by Category
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Figure 1.2b. Frequency of Positive and Negative Wholesale Price Changes in Percents by Category
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Figure 1.2c. Frequency of Positive and Negative Wholesale Price Changes in Percents by Category
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Figure 2.1a. Frequency of Positive and Negative Wholesale Price Changes in Cents by Category,
Low/Zero Inflation Period
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Figure 2.1b. Frequency of Positive and Negative Wholesale Price Changes in Cents by Category,
Low/Zero Inflation Period
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Figure 2.1c.Frequency of Positive and Negative Wholesale Price Changes in Cents by Category,
Low/Zero Inflation Period
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Price Change in Cents
Oatmeal Negative
Positive
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Price Change in Cents
Paper Towels Negative
Positive
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Price Change in Cents
Refrigerated Juices Negative
Positive
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Price Change in Cents
Shampoos Negative
Positive
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Price Change in Cents
Snack Crackers Negative
Positive
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Price Change in Cents
Soaps Negative
Positive
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Price Change in Cents
Soft Drinks Negative
Positive
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Price Change in Cents
Toothbrushes Negative
Positive
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Price Change in Cents
Toothpastes Negative
Positive
0
200000
400000
600000
800000
1000000
1200000
1400000
1600000
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Price Change in Cents
Total Negative
Positive
Wholesale Price Asymmetry (Ray, Chen, Bergen, Levy)
30 of 39 Technical Appendix
Figure 2.2a.Frequency of Positive and Negative Wholesale Price Changes in Percents by Category,
Low/Zero Inflation Period
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Figure 2.2b.Frequency of Positive and Negative Wholesale Price Changes in Percents by Category,
Low/Zero Inflation Period
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Figure 2.2c.Frequency of Positive and Negative Wholesale Price Changes in Percents by Category,
Low/Zero Inflation Period
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Figure 3.1a. Frequency of Positive and Negative Wholesale Price Changes in Cents by
Category, Deflation Period
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Figure 3.1b. Frequency of Positive and Negative Wholesale Price Changes in Cents by
Category, Deflation Period
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Figure 3.1c.Frequency of Positive and Negative Wholesale Price Changes in Cents by
Category, Deflation Period
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Figure 3.2a.Frequency of Positive and Negative Wholesale Price Changes in Percents by
Category, Deflation Period
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Price Change in Percents
Negative
Positive
Analgesics
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Price Change in Percents
Negative
Positive
Bath Soap
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Price Change in Percents
Negative
Positive
Bathroom Tissues
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Price Change in Percents
Negative
Positive
Beer
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
80000
90000
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Price Change in Percents
Negative
Positive
Bottled Juices
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
80000
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Price Change in Percents
Negative
Positive
Canned Soup
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Price Change in Percents
Negative
Positive
Canned Tuna
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
80000
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Price Change in Percents
Negative
Positive
Cereals
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
140000
160000
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Price Change in Percents
Negative
Positive
Cheeses
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Price Change in Percents
Negative
Positive
Cigarettes
Wholesale Price Asymmetry (Ray, Chen, Bergen, Levy)
37 of 39 Technical Appendix
Figure 3.2b.Frequency of Positive and Negative Retail Wholesale Changes in Percents by
Category, Deflation Period
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Figure 3.2c.Frequency of Positive and Negative Wholesale Price Changes in Percents by
Category, Deflation Period
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